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The Legal Revolution Against the Place of Religion:
The Case of Trinity Western University Law School
Barry W. Bussey *
The special legal status of religion and religious freedom in liberal
democracies has become an issue of controversy among legal academics
and lawyers. There is a growing argument that religion is not special and
that the law should be amended to reflect that fact. This Article argues
that religion is special. It is special because of the historical, practical, and
philosophical realities of liberal democracies. Religious freedom is a
foundational principle that was instrumental in creating the modern
liberal democratic state. To remove religion from its current legal station
would be a revolution that would put liberal democracy in a precarious
position. This is in part because the right to believe and practice one’s
religion has been described as a “prototypical” right. It blazed the trail
for other commonly recognized rights such as freedom of association,
assembly, speech, and fair trial. There is a broad need for a deeper
appreciation of religion; in particular, it is vital to understand how its
protection makes democracy work by keeping in check the tendency of the
state to demand ultimate allegiance at the expense of
individual conscience.

*Barry W. Bussey, BA, LLB, MA, LLM, MPACS, a PhD student in law, University of Leiden,
Netherlands (Promotor – Professor Paul Cliteur); Director, Legal Affairs, Canadian Council of
Christian Charities; Adjunct Associate Professor at The University of Notre Dame, Sydney,
Australia. Special thanks to Nevena Belovska, Janet Epp-Buckingham, Paul Cliteur, Derek Ross,
Bruce Cameron, Iain T. Benson, and Carmelle D. Dieleman for sharing their ideas and
suggestions to make this a better paper.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article posits that religious freedom is a foundational right
and principle that was instrumental in creating the modern liberal
democratic state. The historical, practical, and philosophical realities
of liberal democracies justify maintaining religion’s special treatment
in Canadian law. In fact, respect for religious freedom as it
accommodates religious practice is necessary for the practical
implementation of liberal democratic theory. Religious freedom is a
prototypical right that helped forge the path for the legal recognition
of other rights such as freedom of assembly, 1 and freedom of speech.
Indeed, as noted by James Q. Whitman, “the history of the common
law is inextricably bound up with the general Western history of
Christianity.” 2 Whitman’s account of the legal right to a fair trial
beyond a reasonable doubt is but one example. It was the Christian
moral theology that: “A judge who sentenced an accused person to a
blood punishment while experiencing ‘doubt’ about guilt committed
a mortal sin, and thus put his own salvation in peril,” that underlay
the concept of reasonable doubt. 3 However, there is a significant
group of academics and practitioners in the legal profession that is
challenging the role and respect that law has traditionally given to
religious freedom in Canadian society. This opposition is becoming
more pronounced in cases that arise from the clash of religious
freedom with sexual equality rights.
This phenomenon is likened to a revolution. Revolutions have
existed throughout history in various forms and areas of human
existence. The theory of scientific revolutions is used to analyze the
current legal revolution against the place of religious freedom in
society. The Article also contrasts legal revolutions from scientific
revolutions in its goals, methodology, and perspectives. These
differences are based in the varying values and desired outcomes of
each profession. The present legal revolution to strip religion of its
favored legal status puts liberal democracy in a precarious position.

1. JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 164
(2012) (Inazu notes that in the United States it was the work of William Penn and Roger
Williams that ensured dissenting religious groups could exercise their freedom in opposition to
majoritarian norms.).
2. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS
OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 5 (2008).
3. Id. at 4.
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There is a need among legal practitioners, academics, and judiciary
alike for a deeper appreciation of religion and how its protection
stabilizes democracies and keeps in check the state’s tendency to
demand ultimate allegiance at the expense of individual conscience.
Through exploring Trinity Western University’s (“TWU”) law school
proposal and the opposition to it by the legal profession, this Article
seeks to demonstrate the practical application of its contention that
opposition to religion’s legal protection is revolutionary and, if
successful, foreshadows a denial of democratic values and principles.
Instead of an expansion of human rights, this opposition to religious
freedom leads to a degradation of those rights, both institutionally
and individually.
TWU is a private Christian university located in Langley, British
Columbia (“BC”). To understand TWU’s law school case you must
first know that in 2001 the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”)
ordered the BC College of Teachers (“BCCT”) to accredit TWU’s
education degree.4 The BCCT had denied accreditation because of
TWU’s requirement that its students sign a “Community Standards”
document that outlined the school’s behavioral expectations of
students. 5 Among those was the requirement that they not engage in
activity outside of its religious sexual norms. The BCCT felt that TWU
graduates who became public school teachers would discriminate
against homosexual students. 6 The SCC recognized that the BC
human rights legislation and the Charter did not apply to TWU. 7 It
held that there was no evidence for the BCCT’s claim 8 and allowed
the mandamus order for the accreditation of TWU’s
education degree. 9
In 2012, TWU proposed a law school and sought accreditation at
the Federation of the Law Societies of Canada. 10 That submission

4. Trinity W. Univ. v. B.C. Coll. of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, para.
43 (Can.).
5. Id. at paras. 5,6.
6. Id. at para. 21.
7. Id. at para. 25.
8. Id. at paras. 35, 42.
9. Id. at para. 43.
10. TRINITY W. UNIV., PROPOSAL FOR A SCHOOL OF LAW AT TRINITY WESTERN
UNIVERSITY, (June 2012), https://www.twu.ca/sites/default/files/assets/proposal-for-aschool-of-law-at-twu.pdf.
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created a huge controversy in the legal profession because TWU
continued to require students to sign a “Community Covenant” that
stated, in part, “[i]n keeping with biblical and TWU ideals,
community members voluntarily abstain from . . . sexual intimacy that
violates the sacredness of marriage between a man and a woman.”11
The legal profession’s regulators in BC, 12 Ontario, 13 and Nova Scotia14
carried out an unprecedented review of the law school proposal
despite the Federation’s approval. 15 These law societies ultimately
rejected the law school and are now defending their decisions
in court. 16
The TWU case illustrates the legal community’s awkwardness in
having to support a legal framework that is out of step with their own
current thinking on religion’s place in the public sphere. For many,
religion has no place outside houses of worship. 17 That position argues

11. Community Covenant Agreement, TRINITY W. UNIV., https://www.twu.ca/studenthandbook/university-policies/community-covenant-agreement (last visited Nov. 5, 2016).
12. LSBC Seeks Input on Proposed TWU Law School, DYE & DURHAM,
https://www.dyedurhambc.com/news/bc-law-watch/lsbc-seeks-input-on-proposed-twu-lawschool/ (last visited Jun. 14, 2016).
13. Treasurer’s Remarks on the Law School Program Proposed by Trinity Western University
(Jan. 23, 2014), http://goo.gl/Os1qZF.
14. Seeking input on Trinity Western’s application for a law school, N.S. BARRISTERS’ SOC’Y
(Feb. 13, 2014), http://nsbs.org/event/2014/02/seeking-input-trinity-westerns-applicationlaw-school-feb-13.
15. Trinity Western University’s Proposed Common Law Program, FED’N L. SOC’YS CAN.,
http://www.flsc.ca/en/twu-common-law-program/ (expressing concerns with TWU’s
teaching of legal ethics and public law and the budget of the proposed law program.).
16. The Law Society of British Columbia’s materials are found at: https://www.—
lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=3912; The LSBC lost TWU’s judicial review at the BC Supreme
Court in Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 2015 ONSC 4250 (Can.), and the LSUC
was successful at the Ontario Court of Appeal in Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can.,
2016 ONCA 518 (Can.). The ONCA decision is currently on appeal at the SCC. See also TWU
Matter, Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society (http://nsbs.org/twu-matter). The NSBS lost TWU’s
judicial review at the Nova Scotia Supreme Court in Trinity W. Univ. v. Nova Scotia Barristers’
Soc’y, 2015 NSSC 25 (Can.), and further lost at the NS Court of Appeal in Nova Scotia Barristers’
Soc’y v Trinity W. Univ., 2016 NSCA 59 (Can.). The NSBS decided not to appeal to the SCC. See
Update on Trinity Western University Matter, Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society
(http://nsbs.org/news/2016/08/update-trinity-western-university-matter).
17. Robert Wintemute, Religion vs. Sexual Orientation: A Clash of Human Rights?, 1 J.L.
& EQUAL. 125, 141 (2002) (“Although religious individuals may find it hard to put their
religious beliefs aside when they enter the public sphere, a liberal democracy cannot function in
any other way. This also means that religious individuals who accept employment in the public
sector cannot insist on being exempted from serving LGBT individuals or same-sex couples,
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that religious communities must abide by public norms when
operating a state-recognized university. The complex relationship
between the individual and the state is laid bare. State denial of TWU’s
law degree, because of its admissions policy, is being challenged in
court as an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of religion.
This Article presents an argument that such a denial is problematic. In
short, it argues that the individual, being the basic unit of our
democracy, must maintain the right to determine his or her
responsibility to the spiritual sovereign 18 of his or her life; otherwise
the individual is no longer free.
In Part II we begin with a description of religion’s special legal
status before the legal revolution that seeks to change that status. I
argue that religion’s peculiar place in the law is due to the human
search for meaning and purpose. The truth claims that came as a result
of that search were often at odds with the demands of the state. There
were (and still are) two claims on a person’s allegiance—the personal
conscience (religion) and the state. However, through historical,
practical, and philosophical realities in the Western context we ended
up with religion’s special place in the law.
Part III introduces the concept of revolution and how it applies to
the current debate about religion and its interaction with sexual
equality claims. To help with this analysis, I use the work of Thomas
S. Kuhn and his evaluation of how new scientific ideas could go from
being outliers to mainstream scientific understandings of the world.
Kuhn’s analysis forms a backdrop to consider whether a similar process
might also happen in law. There are a number of acknowledged
differences between science and law. However, I suggest it is a good
vantage point to consider how religion’s special place in the law, which
would not have been challenged in a significant way fifty years ago, is
today deemed an unnecessary relic of the past.
Finally, the Article closes by arguing that we have to agree to
disagree if we are to live in peace, order and good government on the
same real estate. It is my position that religion’s special status is critical
for the democratic experiment because it is a prototypical right, in that
it has trailblazed for other rights.

whether this involves selling them stamps, teaching them, or a few years from now,
marrying them.”).
18. “Sovereignty” is defined infra Section II.C.
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II. BEFORE THE REVOLUTION: RELIGION IS SPECIAL AND UNIQUE
A. Religion’s Special Legal Treatment
A cursory glance at the law of liberal democracies reveals the
prominent role religious accommodation plays in liberal society.
Religion has been, and continues to be, treated by the law as special.
Consider, for example, that holy days must be accommodated in the
workplace, 19 but a day off to attend a political rally is not. Similarly, a
student in school may wear a religious ceremonial dagger, 20 but a
student wearing a hunting knife in school would not be tolerated.
Further, an individual of the Jewish faith may erect a sukkah on his or
her condominium balcony during his or her religious holy days, but a
person would not be permitted to set up a small tent for non-religious
purposes. 21 These are three examples of religiously motivated acts that
are accommodated, despite the fact that those same acts motivated by
non-religious beliefs would not be tolerated. We must conclude that
there is something unique about religion that created a willingness in
Western law to be flexible in exempting religious practices from
generally applicable legal norms. 22 In order to have a coherent
conception of freedom of religion, we must first affirmatively
value religion. 23
Broad respect for religious rights is deeply rooted in the traditional
and important place of the Christian faith in Canadian history. Justice
Rand in Saumur v. City of Quebec provides a brief history of this fact
19. Ont. Human Rights. Comm’n v. Simpsons-Sears, Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 (Can.).
20. Multani v. Comm’n scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (Can.).
21. Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (Can.).
22. An in-depth study about the “public good” of religion is not something this paper is
addressing though it would certainly be germane to a larger work. Brevity requires that the
“public good” tributary not be canvassed here. There are a number of compelling pieces on that
point that I refer the reader to James Davison Hunter, Law, Religion, and the Common Good, 39
PEPP. L. REV. 1065 (2013). For a provocative psychological argument see ARA NORENZAYAN,
BIG GODS: HOW RELIGION TRANSFORMED COOPERATION AND CONFLICT (2013). For an
empirical analysis of religion’s economic value to society see Brian J. Grim & Melissa Grim, The
Socio-economic Contribution of Religion to American Society: An Empirical Analysis, 12
INTERDISC. J. RES. ON RELIGION (2016), http://www.religjournal.com/pdf/ijrr12003.pdf.
23. As Jeremy Webber notes, “we are fooling ourselves if we think we can define a
coherent conception of freedom of religion without recognizing that the freedom presupposes
an affirmative valuing of religion.” Jeremy Webber, Understanding the Religion in Freedom of
Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION IN THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 27 (Peter Cane,
Carolyn Evans & Zoë Robinson eds., 2008).
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in Canadian law. 24 “The Christian religion,” Justice Rand maintained,
“stands in the first rank of social, political and juristic importance.”25
From 1760, religious freedom has been recognized in the Canadian
legal system “as a principle of fundamental character.” 26 That the
“untrammelled affirmations of religious belief and its propagation,
personal or institutional, remain as of the greatest constitutional
significance throughout the Dominion is unquestionable.” 27 Further, he
suggested that freedom of religion was among the “original
freedoms,” and thus was a necessary attribute and mode of human
self-expression that forms the primary conditions of “community life
within a legal order.” 28 Rand not only saw the importance of the
religious life of the individual but also understood the “communal”
aspect of religion that has a powerful impact on society as reflected in
the law.
The legal imposition of distinctly Christian norms, as seen in the
former Sunday legislation, is no longer given the same recognition in
Canadian law. 29 This is true, for that matter, in most other Western
democracies as well. 30 However, there are vestiges of that heritage that
24. Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, 329 (Can.).
25. Id. at para. 88.
26. Id. at para. 89 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at paras. 89, 96 (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 337 (Can.). In this case, Chief
Justice Brian Dickson rejecting the constitutionality of The Lord’s Day Act stated:
To the extent that it binds all to a sectarian Christian ideal, the Lord’s Day Act works
a form of coercion inimical to the spirit of the Charter and the dignity of all nonChristians. In proclaiming the standards of the Christian faith, the Act creates a
climate hostile to, and gives the appearance of discrimination against, non-Christian
Canadians. It takes religious values rooted in Christian morality and, using the force
of the state, translates them into a positive law binding on believers and non-believers
alike. The theological content of the legislation remains as a subtle and constant
reminder to religious minorities within the country of their differences with, and
alienation from, the dominant religious culture.
Non-Christians are prohibited for religious reasons from carrying out activities which
are otherwise lawful, moral and normal. The arm of the state requires all to remember
the Lord’s Day of the Christians and to keep it holy. The protection of one religion
and the concomitant non protection of others imports disparate impact destructive of
the religious freedom of the collectivity . . . .
Id. (emphasis omitted).
30. Consider for example the changes in the U.K. that has relaxed blue law restrictions
on larger stores at Trading hours for retailers: the law, GOV.UK (Sept. 23, 2016),
https://www.gov.uk/trading-hours-for-retailers-the-law.
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remain in the law. In Canada, for example, the Roman Catholic
Church elementary and secondary schools in the Province of Ontario
still retain government funding because of the provisions of the
Constitutional Act, 1867. 31 Philosophers such as Jürgen Habermas
continue to observe the pivotal role Christianity played in laying the
foundation of our current liberal democracy. 32
Habermas is of the view that Christianity’s normative force in
modern self-understanding is more than a mere precursor or a
catalyst. 33 Egalitarian universalism and ideas of freedom, individual
rights, human rights, and democracy directly flow from the Judaic
ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. 34 He sees no alternative,
and we continue to draw on this heritage. For Habermas, “Everything
else is just idle postmodern talk.” 35
Religion has played a crucial role in Western legal tradition and it
continues to influence cultural and legal norms. However, there are
different social and legal streams of thought seeking to dismantle and
remove all vestiges of Christian normativity. In particular, the
opposition is directed at the Christian sexual norm of heterosexual
marriage. 36 Although such a norm is not limited to Christianity, this
Article emphasizes the Christian religion because of its profound
influence in Western law.
Religion’s special treatment by the law is based on the
presupposition that religion is valuable. Lawmakers, public policy
makers, opinion leaders and society at large have held this view, both
now and in generations gone by. The next Section will demystify why
the law has so tenaciously protected religion as part of the liberal
democratic legal framework.

31. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3 (U.K.); see also Adler v. Ontario, [1996]
3 S.C.R. 609 (Can.).
32. SOC. SCI. RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POST-SECULAR IN QUESTION: RELIGION IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (Philip S. Gorski et al. eds., 2012).
33. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, TIME OF TRANSITIONS 150–51 (Ciaran Cronin & Max Pensky
eds. & trans. 2006)
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Bruce MacDougall, The Separation of Church and Date: Destabilizing Traditional
Religion-based Legal Norms on Sexuality, 36 U.B.C. L. REV. 1 (2003).
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B. The Search for Meaning and Purpose
The special status of religion is rooted in what it means to be
human. From the very beginning of human consciousness, many have
posed fundamental questions about the meaning and purpose of
human life. The search for those answers led to the ontological and
epistemological struggle toward knowledge by introducing questions
such as, “what do I know,” “how can I know that I know,” “who am
I,” “where did I come from,” “what is my purpose,” and “where am
I going.” Such questions are fundamental to human existence
and coexistence.
Our search for meaning has had a profound impact on the place
of religion within our legal framework. As Harold Berman suggests,
“neither law nor history can be understood, and more than that,
neither can be preserved, if the legal tradition of which they are both
part is forgotten or rejected.” 37 Beyond any doubt, Christian religion
highly influenced Western legal tradition.
The historical record suggests that religion was not added to the
constitutions of liberal democracies by chance, but rather by design.38
This design is firmly established in a history steeped in human events
and philosophical inquiry as to the meaning of life. Religion was not
an invention for political manipulation of the colonial populations as
“a means of pinning down and managing the ideas and practices” 39 for
the best interests of the West. Religion has always had and continues
to have a major role assisting humanity in understanding the world
and one’s duty toward the other in alleviating human suffering.

37. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT
REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 382 (2003).
38. Consider the full debate over the First Amendment in the US Constitution so aptly
retold in JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT:
ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 64–86 (2000).
39. DEREK PETERSON & DARREN WALHOF, THE INVENTION OF RELIGION:
RETHINKING BELIEF IN POLITICS AND HISTORY 7 (2002).
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C. A Tale of Two Sovereignties
“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.” 40
This classical definition of sovereignty by Carl Schmitt is an
appropriate place to start the discussion about sovereignty. With
whom does the “buck” stop? Who is the authority that has the
ultimate say on ultimate things? These questions bedevil us.41
Schmitt noted that an exception to a legal norm is not contained in
the norm. 42 It can only be permitted by the sovereign—the one who
has “the authority to suspend valid law.” 43 That is
“unlimited authority.” 44
“Whether God alone is sovereign,” said Schmitt, in the form of
God’s representative on earth, “or the emperor, or prince, or the
people . . . the question is always aimed at the subject of sovereignty,
at the application of the concept to a concrete situation.” 45 The
interplay between law and religion that is addressed by this Article
involves concrete realities over how the body politic will deal with the
non-conformist religious entities who claim allegiance to a sovereign
beyond the political sovereign.
Sovereignty is bifurcated into political and religious sovereignty.
Indeed Schmitt noted that:
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are
secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical
development – in which they were transferred from theology to the
theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God
became the omnipotent lawgiver—but also because of their

40. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY 5 (2005).
41. F.H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY (2d ed. 1986); DIETER GRIMM & BELINDA COOPER,
SOVEREIGNTY: THE ORIGIN AND FUTURE OF A POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONCEPT (2015);
ROBERT JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY: EVOLUTION OF AN IDEA (2007); SOVEREIGNTY IN
FRAGMENTS: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF A CONTESTED CONCEPT (Hent Kalmo &
Quentin Skinner eds., 2010).
42. Schmitt, supra note 40, at 6.
43. Id. at 9.
44. Id. at 12.
45. Id. at 10.
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systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a
sociological consideration of these consideration of these concepts. 46

Every person is faced with two claims (or spheres) of loyalty or
allegiance: state and religious. Both claim sole allegiance. The first
claim is the state where one lives and/or has citizenship—it may be
called “the secular claim of sovereignty.” The state, did not always
consider itself “secular” (that is to say, religiously neutral). 47 Rather,
the state has often claimed to be divine, thereby having ultimate
authority. The other claim of sovereignty comes from within the
personal conscience. It is separate from the state and referred to as the
private realm. It often has a personal and/or communal conception of
the divine or Supreme Being. This is the religious claim of sovereignty.
Throughout history there has been a constant struggle between
the two claims. The state, in whatever form, has often sought to
impose its authority on the individual conscience. The one consistent
exception to that general rule is the modern liberal democratic society.
However, even when liberal democracies have failed to protect the
individual conscience, they often did so knowingly and in exceptional
circumstances, with the specific promise that it would be monitored
in accordance with democratic principles and restored in due course.48

46. Id. at 36.
47. Even the claim that there is such a thing as “religiously neutral” is not without
its critics.
48. On June 18, 1940, Rt. Hon. MacKenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, introduced
the War Measures Mobilization Act, to authorize government to take all necessary means to
fight Germany in WWII including the imposition of conscription and the right to expropriate
property for the war cause. He said in the House of Commons, “It must be kept in mind that
we shall be administering this legislation not as a body of dictators, free from any kind of control,
but as a responsible government, responsible to the House of Commons and, through the House
of Commons, to the people. If we bear this all important fact in mind, then I think it will be
found that there is ample security as to the way in which the government may exercise the powers
given it under the legislation.” House of Commons Debates, 18th Parliament, 6th Session: Vol.
1, p. 903, http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC1806_01/925?r=0&s=3. Further,
King recognized that his government would honour Canada’s historical commitment to
religious groups not to force them to bear arms for their settling in the country. “I wish solemnly
to assure the house and the country that the government have no desire and no intention to
disturb the existing rights of exemption from the bearing of arms which are enjoyed by members
of certain religious groups in Canada, as for example the Mennonites. We are determined to
respect these rights to the full.” House of Commons Debates, 18th Parliament, 6th Session: Vol.
1, p. 904. Note he did not commit to those religious groups who had no such agreement with
the government. However, eventually the government did provide a means for other religious
groups to obtain religious exemptions from having to bear arms. See Barry W. Bussey, Humbug!
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The fact that liberal democracies go to great lengths to explain why
individual conscience had to be violated in a given situation is, in and
of itself, a recognition of the importance of the concept.
Despite their differences, law and religion must cooperatively
coexist in order to make liberal democracy work. Because both claim
sole allegiance of the individual, they are required to arrive at a détente
on the issue of sovereignty. Liberal democratic society works best
when sovereignty is bifurcated in two spheres. One is temporal
sovereignty, or the duty to follow the law of the land. This refers to
human-made law, or “positive law,” as defined by legislatures, courts,
and custom. The second is spiritual sovereignty, or the duty to follow
the law of God. This refers to the non-human-made law that is defined
by holy books or divine revelation, or “natural law,” as understood by
the individual conscience. The current battles between law and
religion are analogous to the ancient battles over sovereignty. Some
two thousand years ago, it was stylized this way by Jesus: “Render
therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God
the things that are God’s.” 49
For a liberal democracy to work, both law and religion must have
one common objective: to provide the most effective means whereby
the individual has the greatest amount of freedom to pursue
happiness, as he or she defines it, while at the same time maintaining
civil peace in the political community. This will be referred to as the
“Liberal Democratic Project.” The Reformation and its aftermath
provided the West its paramount identity—individual freedom. 50 The
individual is responsible to obey the respective sovereign demands of
the state and his or her religious or conscientious conviction.
Any disruption to the delicate balance between the two spheres of
sovereignty ultimately results in the modern state’s attempt to
dominate both. This happens because the state has executive power;
that is, an army and a police force that it can use to enforce its dictates.

Seventh-day Adventist conscientious objectors in WWII standing before the Mobilization Board, 6.3
DIVERSITY MAG. (2012), http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/creed-freedom-religion-and-humanrights-special-issue-diversity-magazine-volume-93-summer-2012/humbug-seventh-dayadventist-conscientious-objectors-wwii-standing-mobilization.
49. Matthew 22:21 (King James).
50. ALISTER E. MCGRATH, CHRISTIANITY’S DANGEROUS IDEA: THE PROTESTANT
REVOLUTION—A HISTORY FROM THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY TO THE TWENTY-FIRST (2007).
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In Western democracies, religions do not have armies. 51 While some
militias have taken on religious garb over the years, as in Northern
Ireland for example, 52 the reality is that throughout the modern
period, meaning post-Reformation, Western religious groups have not
taken up arms to enforce their edicts on society. 53 This crucial fact has
not received much attention from Western critics of religion.
In the West, law and religion have an unequal power relationship.
The state can always enforce its laws, if it so chooses, at the expense of
religion. However, for the most part, the liberal state has allowed
religion to maintain its own sphere of influence with very little
hindrance. That indifference of the state, as we already noted and will
explore further below, appears to be changing.
Once the state takes over both spheres of sovereignty, it takes on
“divine” characteristics, meaning that it becomes omniscient and
omnipotent. It assumes it can determine for the individual what will
ultimately be sovereign. 54 At that point, the liberal democratic society
that places high value on individual autonomy is in severe crisis and
may, in fact, be over. This is the modus operandi of dictatorships.
Therefore, the bifurcation of sovereignty forms the very foundation of
liberal democratic theory and requires the continuation of the unique
status of religion in liberal democratic societies.

51. Perhaps the criticism of Christianity is due, in no small part, because of the fear of
ISIL-like religion. Thanks to Paul Cliteur for this insight.
52. EX-COMBATANTS, RELIGION, AND PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ROLE OF
RELIGION IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 13 (John D. Brewer, David Mitchell & Gerard Leavey
eds., 2013) (“[P]olitical and religious leaders who viewed politics as a religious battle succeeded
in inspiring their followers to see the national cause with a similar intensity of conviction, whether
or not those people shared the leaders’ religious beliefs.”).
53. It truly is absurd in Western religious thought to think that violence is the means to
advance a religious cause. Consider the pacifists groups like the Quakers and the Mennonites.
Or groups like Seventh-day Adventists with their refusal to bear arms in war. Even the
mainstream Christian & Jewish groups eschew force. WILLIAM T. CAVANAUGH, THE MYTH OF
RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE (2009) makes a convincing argument on this point. The view that the
religion in the West is “dangerous” and should therefore be removed from the public is a myth
says Cavanaugh. Rather, the myth becomes a justification for the violence of western democracies
against Muslim societies. Today’s violence of the West is seen as “secular, rational, peace making,
and regrettably necessary to contain their violence. We find ourselves obliged to bomb them into
liberal democracy.” Id. at 4.
54. See, e.g., DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN art. 3 (France
1789), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp (“The principle of all sovereignty
resides essentially in the nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does
not proceed directly from the nation.”).
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To suggest that religion is not special is to deny the collective
experiences of the West that suffered the negative consequences of
those policies that refused to bifurcate sovereignty. Our history, the
legal history of the West, demonstrates the unique character of
religion in our law.
D. The Three Realities of Western Experience
Liberal democratic societies found a formula that provides
unprecedented peace and stability, leading to expansive personal and
economic freedom. That formula is the rebuttable presumption that
religious belief and practice should be as maximally accommodated as
can be reasonably expected in the circumstances. This formula is the
result of the three realities of the collective experience of Western
democracies: the historical, the practical, and the philosophical.
1. Historical
Western history is replete with the ebb and flow of the state
demanding ultimate allegiance from its citizens. From the ancient
Roman emperors onward there have been examples of states
demanding capitulation of religious sovereignty in its favor. The
Liberal Democratic Project gave the West a reprieve from state
domination over the individual religious conscience.
The use of religion as a means of cementing loyalty to the state
has a long pedigree. As we will see, such use of religion led to great
abuse and we would do well not to repeat it. Polybius, after living
seventeen years in Rome, wrote in 150 BC, “The quality in which the
Roman commonwealth is most distinctly superior is, in my judgment,
the nature of its religion. The very thing that among other nations is
an object of reproach—i.e., superstition—is that which maintains the
cohesion of the Roman state.” 55
Western democratic thought has been profoundly influenced by
Israel as well as the Greek and Roman civilizations. In ancient Rome,
the “eternal city,” 56 the two sovereignties were combined. The
sovereignty of man and the sovereignty of the divine were together in
55. WILL DURANT, CAESAR AND CHRIST 93 (1944) (quoting 4 POLYBIUS, HISTORIES
56 (Loeb Classical Library ed. 1925)).
56. JOHN WITTE JR., GOD’S JOUST, GOD’S JUSTICE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE
WESTERN TRADITION 9 (2006).
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the personhood of the emperor. 57 The emperor was both the king of
man and God of man—the ultimate authority. 58 The temporal and
divine authorities were personified in the emperor.
The advent of the Christian religion saw sovereignty bifurcated to
the temporal and the divine. The emperor was merely human and not
divine. Divinity existed only in the Christian God, expressed in the
three Persons of the Godhead. 59 However, Constantine’s conversion
put in process the “syncretism of Roman and Christian beliefs” that
“subordinated the Church to imperial rule.” 60 State domination of the
Roman Catholic Church continued until the Papal Revolution in the
late 11th century when Pope Gregory VII led the clergy to throw “off
their civil rulers and established the Roman Catholic Church as an
autonomous
legal
and
political
corporation
within
Western Christendom.” 61
Over time the ascendance of the church brought the temporal and
the divine back together in the office of the Roman Pontiff who
“claimed the supremacy of the spiritual sword over the temporal,”
though he claimed to do so indirectly. 62 Christendom combined
church and state, with the pope presiding over the territorial kings.63
The church developed its own system of canon law administered by
its courts, registered citizens by baptism, taxed by tithes, conscripted
through crusades, and educated the populace in its schools. 64 In short,

57. Indeed even before Rome the ancient Greeks recognized their kings as divine. Numa
Denis Fustel de Coulanges describes it this way, “A king was a sacred being; βασιλεις λεροι, says
Pindar. Men saw in him, not a complete God, but at least ‘the most powerful man to call down
the anger of the gods; the man without whose aid no prayer was heard, no sacrifice accepted.’”
NUMA DENIS FUSTEL DE COULANGES, THE ANCIENT CITY: A STUDY OF THE RELIGION, LAWS,
AND INSTITUTIONS OF GREECE AND ROME 178 (Dover Publications 2006) (Willard Small
trans., 1955).
58. Speaking of Augustus, Edward Gibbon writes, “Augustus permitted indeed some of
the provincial cities to erect temples to his honour, on condition that they should associate the
worship of Rome with that of the sovereign.” 1 EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF
THE ROMAN EMPIRE 91 (1993).
59. That is to say, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.
60. WITTE JR., supra note 38, at 11.
61. Id. at 12.
62. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 115 (1983).
63. MCGRATH, supra note 50, at 326.
64. WITTE JR., supra note 38, at 15.
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the church was the first modern state in the West. 65 Granted, it did not
have the same freedoms we associate with a modern state, but it had
a form of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches that we find
familiar in today’s states.
Of course, the church did not totally dominate the state in all
situations, nor did the state dominate the church in all contexts.
Which institution dominated was complicated by the personalities
involved, the issues to be decided, and the territories concerned. Both
clergy and lay—the spiritual and the secular—were ostensibly working
for the salvation of embodied souls. 66 However, corruption was rife;
both spheres were caught up with avarice, nepotism, and abuse of
power. According to University of Notre Dame professor Brad S.
Gregory, the Reformation would crystalize the dominance of secular
leaders over the church. 67
The Reformation confirmed what had been developing for some
time, that the individual was not solely a citizen of the state but of two
distinct spheres: one being the kingdom of God, for which the
individual has a direct relationship with God, and the other being the
kingdom of man as represented by the king (or the earthly authority).
These concepts would have profound practical implications.
2. Practical: the tension between religion and the law
When confronted with an obstinate citizenry, Western states could
not force religious belief or practice without being willing to let rivers
of blood, fear, and suffering appear on the streets. 68 Nor did the state

65. BERMAN, supra note 37, at 113.
66. BRAD S. GREGORY, THE UNINTENDED REFORMATION: HOW A RELIGIOUS
REVOLUTION SECULARIZED SOCIETY 132 (2012).
67. Id. at 166.
68. Canadian authorities tried to convince Mennonites to agree to alternative service
camps under military control in light of the Mennonites refusal to bear arms in WWII. At one
point during the negotiations Maj.-Gen. L. R. La Fleche, then deputy Minister of the National
War Services, stated in frustration, “What’ll you do if we shoot you?” Jacob H. Janzen, of the
Mennonites and who had escaped the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, replied, “Listen, Major
General, I want to tell you something. You can’t scare us like that. I’ve looked down too many
rifle barrels in my time to be scared in that way. This thing is in our blood for 400 years and you
can’t take it away from us like you’d crack a piece of kindling over your knee. I was before a
firing squad twice. We believe in this.” WILLIAM JANZEN, THE EXPERIENCE OF MENNONITE,
HUTTERITE, AND DOUKHOBOR COMMUNITIES IN CANADA 207 (1990).
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have the resources to ensure that all citizens believed and practiced the
state religion.
What was a state to do with a religious person or group of persons
who refused to follow the social and legal norms because they violated
their religious sensibility? While methods such as burning heretics at
the stake for translating the Bible or drowning those who insisted on
adult baptism were used during the Reformation as a means of
maintaining order, they were ultimately found not to be the
appropriate manners for maintaining civil peace. Religious freedom for
the unpopular and even the most eccentric religious views was deemed
the best way forward. 69
Law is very much a pragmatic endeavor. As part of the liberal
project, it is tasked with ensuring that societal rules are making peace,
order, and good government possible. Allowing the individual the
maximum amount of freedom in his or her religious pursuit, as long
as it did not disturb the peace, provided general stability. Experience
had taught liberal democracies that religion was to be accommodated.
When the majority in society developed an orthodox position on views
of the transcendent and codified them into law, it created a conflict
with the religious conscience of minority and dissenting views. 70 The
emotive content of the ensuing clash of wills resulted in bloodshed.71
That experience, along with the growing philosophical understanding
that the human heart could not be forced to believe that which it
found repugnant and the theological view that God did not require

69. BRIAN TIERNEY, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN WESTERN THOUGHT 29 (Noel B. Reynolds
& W. Cole Durham, Jr. eds., 1996).
70. For example, the taking of an oath was often seen as a requirement for a witness to
give evidence or for a public official to take office because it induced “the fear and reverence of
God, and the terrors of eternity.” WITTE, JR., supra note 56, at 181. However, as Witte noted
this requirement was eventually dropped to accommodate the religious minorities. Id. at 182.
71. Early in the Reformation period violence broke out between the state authorities and
the emerging Protestants. The Anabaptist uprising in Germany of 1525 was at a cost of some
100,000 lives. JAMES M. STAYER, THE GERMAN PEASANTS’ WAR: AND ANABAPTIST
COMMUNITY OF GOODS 20 (1991). French Huguenots were attacked in March 1562 in France
when Francois, duke of Guise opened fire on some 500 whose only infraction was holding an
illegal worship service. DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, THE REFORMATION: A HISTORY 296–97,
483 (2004). These events only increased in intensity in the coming decades. On August 24,
1572, some 5000 Huguenots suffered execution in the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre. A
semblance of peace arrived with the Peace of Westphalia when church and state recognized that
“crusades simply had not worked” in maintaining a united church. Id. at 483.
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forced obedience to the truth, permitted society to adopt an
accommodating stance toward religious dissenters. 72
The state could no longer be sovereign in the transcendent issues.
It was finite. In matters of conscience it had to remain silent, and it
had to accept diversity. Religious warfare had run its course. “A
yearning for peace led to a new emphasis on toleration,” Professor
Alister McGrath explained, “and growing impatience with religious
disputes.” 73 By 1700 the religious wars were at an end and the
Enlightenment74 made the case that religion had to be a private matter
otherwise it would be a source of conflict. 75 Soon it became evident
that the search for truth was an ongoing project. 76 It had no end;
therefore, individuals and religious communities would be granted the
space to practice their own understanding of their requirements for
compliance with the Sovereign God as they understood Him. The
state had no jurisdiction in such matters. 77
However, as the prominent Yale professor of Protestant history
Rolland Bainton pointed out, religious freedom “has come to depend
upon a diversion of interest.” 78 As long as the religious practice and
belief is of no consequence to the state, the liberal state will not hinder
its practice. However, the moment religious practice or belief becomes
politically salient to the affairs of the state, one can always expect the
liberal state to interfere in its own self-interest.

72. NICHOLAS P. MILLER, THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
DISSENTING PROTESTANTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2012).
73. MCGRATH, supra note 50, at 143.
74. While it is a common thing for many writers today to criticize the Enlightenment
project I am of the view that its early development was very positive for religious freedom and
the place of religion in the law.
75. MCGRATH, supra note 50, at 144.
76. This is readily seen in Thomas Jefferson’s writing of Virginia’s “A Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom.” The Bill noted, “that truth is great and will prevail if left to herself; that
she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict
unless by human interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument and debate; errors
ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict them.” THOMAS JEFFERSON,
WRITINGS 347 (1984).
77. JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, in 5
AMENDMENT I (RELIGION) 82 (1785), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents
/amendI_religions43.html (“We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no mans right
is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its
cognizance.”).
78. ROLAND H. BAINTON, THE TRAVAIL OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 15 (1958).
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Bainton’s observation would explain the liberal state’s treatment
of religious sensibilities on sexual equality, including marriage. As long
as traditional heterosexual marriage was not considered to be of any
political import, the state willingly allowed religions to carry on with
their practice in its own institutions and among its constituency.
3. Philosophical
The liberal democratic project came to be recognized as the
Western state allowing the individual the maximum amount of
freedom while, at the same time, maintaining civil peace. This could
only be possible when the state learned the lessons from earlier
collective experience that there are areas of personal allegiance with
which it cannot interfere, the most important being
religious conscience.
Liberalism is “the philosophical tradition that undergirds the
Western ideal of a political democracy.” 79 It seeks to provide a basis for
civil peace among the many varying, and often contradictory, ideas in
society, thereby allowing for the maximum participation of individuals
in society. Charles Larmore describes liberalism as “the hope that,
despite [the] tendency toward disagreement about matters of ultimate
significance, we can find some way of living together that avoids the
rule of force.” 80
Defining liberalism with any great certainty is a precarious
prospect as there are many philosophers comprising the liberal
community, to which each has added a significant dimension. For
example, John Rawls uses the term “full autonomy” to distinguish his
version of liberalism from the “comprehensive liberalisms” views of
Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. 81 Rawls does not permit
“comprehensive viewss” or general philosophical moral doctrine of
the good life into his “political liberalism,” unlike Kant and Mill. 82
There are, however, some recognizable characteristics of liberalism
that are the basis of the discussion: individualism, egalitarianism,

79. REX AHDAR & IAN LEIGH, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE LIBERAL STATE 51 (2013).
80. Charles Larmore, Political Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 339, 357 (1990); AHDAR &
LEIGH, supra note 79, at 39.
81. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 78 (1993).
82. See id. at 78, 145, 196; AHDAR & LEIGH, supra note 79, at 39.
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universalism, and meliorism. 83 Robert Sharpe adds freedom and
neutrality. 84 Law professors Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh further suggest
rationalism—the favoring of reason over emotion. 85 In reality, all of
these characteristics have a degree of overlap on the core concerns of
liberal theory.
The primary focus of liberal theory is a quest to discover the
rational explanation for the most effective relationship between the
individual and the state that permits the greatest potential for selfrealization in an atmosphere of civil peace. Although it is a quest that
has all kinds of permutations, there are three core concerns of liberal
theory: the rational argument, the individual, and the state. These
three concerns form the basis that permits religious freedom in the
liberal state.
The concept of religious freedom wherein the individual is free to
believe and practice his or her own religion is very much a part of the
liberal democratic emphasis on rationality86, individuality, and the
neutrality of the state. Liberalism sees each individual person “as
worthy as any other, that each must be treated with equal concern
according to some coherent conception of what that means.” 87

83. JOHN GRAY, LIBERALISM xii (2nd ed. 1995); AHDAR & LEIGH, supra note 79, at 39
(“Common to all variants of the liberal tradition is a definite conception, distinctly modern in
character, of man and society. What are the several elements of this conception? It is
individualist, in that it asserts the moral primacy of the person against the claims of any social
collectivity; egalitarian, inasmuch as it confers on all men the same moral status and denies the
relevance to legal or political order of differences in moral worth among human beings;
universalist, affirming the moral unity of the human species and according a secondary
importance to specific historic associations and cultural forms; and meliorist in its affirmation of
the corrigibility and improvability of all social institutions and political arrangements. It is this
conception of man and society which gives liberalism a definite identity which transcends its vast
internal variety and complexity.”).
84. Robert Sharpe, THE CAMBRIDGE LECTURES 1991, 265–66, (Frank E. McArdle ed.,
1991); AHDAR & LEIGH, supra note 79, at 40. Freedom is the idea that the state’s role is to
maximize the human dignity, self-fulfillment, and autonomy while minimizing the interference
with individual moral choice; neutrality—the state and law is to be neutral as to the conception
of the good life.
85. AHDAR & LEIGH, supra note 79, at 40.
86. However, it must be recognized that over the course of recent decades the idea that
religious belief was rational has fallen off. Today the popular account is that religion is irrational
as per BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012), we have come a long way since
Martin Luther’s statement at the Diet of Worms that he needed to be convinced by “clear
argument.” 7 PHILIP SCHAFF, HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 304–05 (1995).
87. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 213 (1986).
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E. Prototypical Nature of Religious Freedom
The historical, practical, and philosophical realities of the
experience with religion allowed the West to learn important
democratic truths. The peculiar nature of and the struggle over
religion required its special protection in the law. As former Chief
Justice Dickson noted in Big M Drug Mart, “[r]eligious belief and
practice are historically prototypical and, in many ways, paradigmatic
of conscientiously-held beliefs and manifestations and are therefore
protected by the Charter.” 88 Consider the following two examples.
First, freedom of expression, speech, and the press were noted by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Dolphin Delivery 89 where the Court
referenced author John Milton’s appeal to the British Parliament in
1664 90 against requiring authors to obtain a government license before
publishing their books. Milton argued,
[W]ho kills a Man kills a reasonable creature, Gods Image; but hee
who destroyes a good Booke, kills reason it selfe, kills the Image of
God, as it were in the eye. Many a man lives a burden to the Earth;
but a good Booke is the pretious life-blood of a master spirit,
imbalm’d and treasur’d up on purpose to a life beyond life. 91

Second, Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice LeBel recognized
freedom of association in Mounted Police Association of
Ontario v. Canada 92 as having “its roots in the protection of religious
minority groups.” 93
Religion is the manifestation of humanity’s quest to understand
the meaning and purpose of life. The revelation of one’s personal
opinion on his or her religious beliefs or non-beliefs engenders
approbation from some but condemnation from others. It is, by
nature, intensely personal and yet public at the same time. Western

88. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, para. 123 (Can.).
89. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.,
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 para. 13 (Can.).
90. John Milton, Areopagitica; A Speech For the Liberty of Unlicenc’d Printing, to the
Parlament of England (1664), https://www.dartmouth.edu/~milton/reading_room/
areopagitica/text.s html.
91. Id.
92. Mounted Police Ass’n of Ontario v. Att’y Gen. of Canada, 2015 SCC 1, [2015] 1
S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
93. Id. at para. 56.
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Christianity, including the Reformation, required the West’s
acquiescence in granting religion space to freely operate. The modern
spin suggests that religion can only operate in the “private” sphere.
For example, Richard Rorty argues, “we shall not be able to keep a
democratic political community going unless the religious believers
remain willing to trade privatization for a guarantee of religious
liberty.” 94 Rorty is not necessarily demanding that religion is to be
cloistered, or that religious people are required to hide their religion,
as religion will often surface in public discussion and debate. To the
extent that one does not want religion to dominate the state, one
could agree with him wholeheartedly. However, the genius of the
West to maintain a peaceful society is the recognition from the state
that it cannot be sovereign in matters of individual conscience.
Trouble ensues the moment the state thinks it is God and rejects the
Liberal Democratic Project.
F. The Law Must Maintain Religion’s Special Status
The growing skepticism95 within the legal establishment toward
religion’s special place in constitutional law is robust and problematic.
The repudiation of religion’s special status will greatly upset the
structure of liberal democracy. It denies the historical lessons learned.
Pragmatically, it will make it very difficult for religious individuals and
their collective communities to obey a law that violates their
conscientious commitment to “God’s law.” Philosophically, the state
will have taken jurisdiction over the individual so that he or she is no
longer free. Sovereignty will no longer be bifurcated. The state will
see itself as having all knowledge of truth and being the final arbiter
thereof. Such omniscience would intrude on an individual’s selfunderstanding of what his or her obligation is to truth. In short, the
state will be divine, not unlike the ancient Roman emperors. The state
alone will possess the keys to ultimate reality and become sovereign in
every sense of the word. In truth, a liberal democracy, by definition,
will not be considered a dictatorship, as was ancient Rome. However,
that does not mean that a liberal democracy will not struggle, based
on a host of circumstances such as external crises (perceived or actual)
that make a population willing to forego individual protections in the
94. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 170–71 (1999).
95. YOSSI NEHUSHTAN, INTOLERANT RELIGION IN A TOLERANT-LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
(2015); LEITER, supra note 86.
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name of security. While state divinity is a problem in dictatorships and
much less of an issue in democracies, it is nevertheless a possibility—
especially when the populace has made up its own mind that a
minority view, such as a religious viewpoint (e.g. TWU’s view and
practice on marriage), is categorically unacceptable.
State divinity is a problematic concept. It removes the power of
choice in determining the ultimate meaning and purpose of life from
the individual. It destroys free will, which is the very essence of
humanity. The core of religious freedom is the core of humanity’s
search for meaning. To suggest religion be removed from
constitutional protection is to strike at the very core of humanity; it
would be unethical and immoral.
Religion is an intrinsic part of the human experience and the desire
for meaning, and, like science, is part of the search for truth. My
reading of liberal democratic theory is that it seeks to maximize the
freedom of the individual while maintaining civil peace in the search
for ultimate reality. Liberal democracies are linear in outlook in that
they are ever striving for the “pursuit of happiness.” The concept of
progress with its ideas of a brighter future motivates the populace. The
relationship between religion and democracy has struggled over
sovereignty but found equilibrium by granting religion special status.
To trifle with that status will weaken, if not dismantle, the Liberal
Democratic Project and will force Western society to relearn why
religion was designated as special in our law to begin with.
Individual religious freedom was a protection of the new world
order where sovereignty was again separated in the temporal and
spiritual, thus allowing the individual to fulfill his or her personal
religious obligation. The temporal sovereignty of the nation state was
thereby kept in check. If the special treatment of religion, as found in
most constitutions of Western democracies, is removed by reading
down the protection by judicial interpretation (which is more likely
than actually amending a constitution to remove the religious head),
then spiritual sovereignty will again be united with temporal
sovereignty. The individual would no longer have the right to fulfill
his or her duty to his or her spiritual sovereign. Such a move would
destroy the liberal democratic society as currently understood.
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III. THE REVOLUTION AGAINST RELIGION
“As the spirit of a people changes, so inevitably does their law.”
John Witte, Jr. 96
The special place of religion in the law is under the scrutiny of an
influential segment of the legal profession. The denunciation of
religious norms on human sexuality is driving this reevaluation of
religion’s status. More particularly, the religious norm regarding
marriage as between one man and one woman is what offends
religion’s legal detractors. The critical position of the legal profession
and the legal scholars that reject religion’s special legal status will be a
legal revolution.
A. The Scientific Revolution: A Comparative Model
Revolution in the scientific field is an apt comparative model to
explain the legal revolution on religion. While there are significant
differences between law and science, they are comparable in that they
each have academic and professional communities with established
norms.
The scientific community has at least two distinct subcommunities: the theoretical and the experimental. The first works
with “pure” scientific theory and experiments to understand nature.
The other is a more practical scientific group—the applied scientists.
They belong to the “technological” group. The technocratic fruits of
science are often co-opted by business entrepreneurs who
manufacture goods for public consumption. Thus, in many quarters
there is a symbiotic relationship between science and business. This is
not an easy path to follow, as there are a number conflicting interests,
as can be seen in the ongoing debate about business support
of universities.
There are distinct characteristics in science that are essential for
our purposes: the community is seeking the truth of what is, it has a
dedicated group that works with theory and experiential knowledge
to determine what is true, and there are practical implications that
impact society at large. The scientific community relies on established
paradigms to determine how best to address any anomaly that research

96. JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND
LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 13 (1997).
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may uncover. Such paradigms are based upon the researchers’
presuppositions and assumptions when they ask questions to
determine what should or should not be done to address any new
development the scientific community faces.
Like the scientific community, the legal community has at least
two subgroups. One is comprised of those who spend a considerable
part of their careers addressing the theoretical and social constructs of
the law and are often confined to academic pursuits at the university.
The other is the practitioners of law—the lawyers—who apply the
principles they learned from their legal training to the problems faced
by their clients in day-to-day living. The pursuit of law, at least in
theory, has lofty aspirations such as justice, equality, human rights, free
and democratic society, and the rule of law. These ideals, and more,
are used in law’s pursuit of making society a better place. Like the
scientific community, the legal community has its own paradigms that
provide its presuppositions and assumptions on how practical matters
should be approached. Law is different from the scientific community
in that it has hierarchical structure that settles professional debate—at
the top of which is the SCC. The scientific community has no
such arbiter.
Both the scientific and legal communities are similar because each
requires significant debate to establish a normative paradigm. Once
that paradigm has gained recognition it is difficult to unseat it with a
new theory or paradigm. This provides for continuity and a high bar
of authenticity for the new to replace the old. But it also has an
intuitive bias toward maintaining the status quo even in the face of
reasonable criticism, based on evidence, that the old norms no longer
describe what is true and/or in the best interest of the community.
B. The Qualitative Difference: Law Settles Disputes; Science
Seeks Truth
The practice of law is not science. It does not seek to find the truth
of the matter in the same way the scientific field seeks truth; rather,
law’s emphasis is on settling disputes. The legal practitioner is
concerned about achieving the best possible result for his or her client.
For good or for ill, the common law system is adversarial.
Nevertheless, truth of a sort is a goal of the legal apparatus. The legal
system as a whole is meant to decipher the truth (the “what
happened?”) in any given case, provided all parties and systems are
working as they should. As long as the judge, or jury, remains neutral
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to the outcome of the dispute and the advocates present their
respective clients’ best positions in conformity with all of the rules of
procedure and ethical standards of the profession, then we presume
that truth will emerge. However, it is not science. It cannot be said
with absolute certainty that the truth was established even when the
legal system worked, that is to say, solved the dispute.
To illustrate this peculiar nature of law, seeking a settlement within
the established legal rules despite the “truth” of the matter, consider
the fact that a lawyer will often have a personal opinion of justice that
is different from his or her client’s opinion. The lawyer, in other
words, is expected to advocate even for a position that he or she would
not personally hold. It is the lawyer’s role to represent the client.
Science, at its best, however, would not do that. A scientist would not
be expected to advocate for a position that he or she knows to be
wrong ab initio. Rather, he or she would be expected to present his
or her research in as objective a manner as possible, recognizing that
he or she does so within the scientific paradigm, as noted above. His
or her research is to discover the universal, the necessary, and the
certain by means of observation, explanation, prediction, and control.
That does not mean there is no rogue scientist who would sacrifice
professional opinion in favor of his or her pharmaceutical employer for
fear of job security. Yet, hopefully that is rare and such a scientist would
not be applauded.
Law, however, is different. We expect lawyers to take the position
of their clients regardless of the lawyer’s personal position. If a scientist
were to do in his or her field what lawyers do in theirs, many would
say that the scientist could not be trusted or respected. That same
could not be said of a lawyer. Instead, a lawyer is applauded for his or
her advocacy skills. Nevertheless, the practice of law is peculiar vis-àvis science. Its primary interest is to settle disputes within a civil order,
not to establish truth.
C. The Commonalities Between Revolutions
History is replete with revolutions of all kinds, social, political,
scientific, technological, and I suggest, legal. Although revolutions are
often styled as eruptions that originate within the hearts and minds of
the common people, it is more likely that revolutions arise from one
group of elites who are dissatisfied with the rule of other elites in
power and who capture the imagination of the populace with the idea
that life will be better under a new regime.
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Consider the parallels between political and scientific
revolutions. 97 First, a political revolution arises from a sense among
the ruling political community that existing institutions are no longer
able to adequately govern in the current environment. 98 A scientific
revolution arises when scientists recognize that the current paradigm
is no longer adequate and accurate to explain a particular natural
phenomenon. Second, political revolutions attempt to change
political institutions that prohibit such change. 99 The only way
forward is to destroy the old institution. This creates a crisis gap where
no institution is ruling. The conservative camp demands a return to
the old, while the progressive seeks to implement new institutions.
Appeals are made to the masses either by persuasive means or political
force. Likewise, in the scientific community, there may be a number
of different groups—with each group favoring one particular
paradigm as the accurate description of the scientific fact and therefore
being the legitimate explanation of the particular phenomenon. For
an indeterminate amount of time, depending on the situation,
arguments made for the respective paradigms tend to be persuasive
only to those within that group. 100 “As in political revolutions,” says
Thomas Kuhn, “so in paradigm choice—there is no standard higher
than the assent of the relevant community.” 101 However, over time as
more evidence gathers and as opinions coalesce one group’s paradigm
will gain favor in the wider community vis-à-vis the rest. Ultimately,
the broader scientific community as a whole will decide what paradigm
is legitimate.
D. The Anatomy of a Scientific Revolution
The scientific community argued for hundreds of years that its
discoveries were an accurate description of reality. It argued that its
discoveries were universal, necessary, and certain. 102 Scientists describe
their process of discovery as the scientific method applied to data in
an objective and consistent manner. Objectivity is paramount.

97. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 93 (1970).
98. Id. at 92.
99. Id. at 93.
100. Id. at 94.
101. Id.
102. 1 STEVEN L. GOLDMAN, SCIENCE WARS: WHAT SCIENTISTS KNOW AND HOW THEY
KNOW IT 14 (2006).
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Therefore, logical reason, not emotion or intuitive bias, is the means
of analysis and organization of the data. The ubiquitous scientific
method consists of a multi-staged experiential process of deductive
analysis that includes observation of a specific phenomenon,
measurement, and experiment to establish a theoretical hypothesis of
what scientists think is reality or truth. Once a theory is formulated
which can explain, predict, and control phenomena, it will be tested,
yet again, with further experimentation to determine whether
modification of the hypothesis is necessary. This method is deemed
the proper objective approach for determining the reality of what is. 103
However, we have now come to understand that scientific truth is
temporal and therefore not immutable. What was determined to be
true years ago has subsequently been found to be inadequate. For
example, Sir Isaac Newton’s law of gravity was found by Albert
Einstein to have fallen short of the truth in that “[i]t did not explain
why the gravitational force on an object was proportional to its
inertial mass.” 104
New revelations of scientific discovery displacing an older truth in
one form or another has become a common feature of scientific
experience. Previously, the accepted view was that new discoveries did
not replace the truth of the past, but actually built upon that truth.
Thomas Kuhn discovered otherwise, as will be discussed below.
1. Paradigm
Scientists operate within a conceptual paradigm that explains the
world. Whenever there is an anomaly, it is explained either as part of
the paradigm or it is ignored. The paradigm creates a bias or a lens
through which everything is viewed. Kuhn noted in his book The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions that “something like a paradigm is
prerequisite to perception itself.” 105 The paradigm is the accepted view
of the world. It is perceived as the “correct” view from which flow the
assumptions and presuppositions that are automatically applied to any
new data that must be interpreted. This results in the use of subjective
analysis when making decisions about what the data revealed.

103. For an introductory description see HUGH G. GAUCH, JR, SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN
BRIEF 267–68 (2012).
104. See Gravity as Curved Space: Einstein’s Theory of General Relativity, U. WINNIPEG,
(Sept. 29, 1999), http://theory.uwinnipeg.ca/mod_tech/node60.html.
105. KUHN, supra note 97, at 113.
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Scientists are not simply discovering reality as it exists, but rather they
are debating, within their own scientific community, the implications
of observed data and coming to conclusions about what that reality
was based on within the paradigm. Thus, different scientists (at
different time periods) used different presuppositions. Such
assumptions or axioms were the result of the scientists’ biases based
on the paradigm that inculcated their understandings during their
years of education and scientific career. The paradigm was their
contextual framework that then made a significant difference on how
they would organize and analyze the data.
2. Crisis
With the passage of time, anomalies accumulate that do not fit the
paradigm. The normal course for scientists faced with “anomalies” in
their scientific study is to address them in one of two ways: first, to see
them as being part of the “dominant paradigm,” or second, to ignore
them altogether. 106 However, as anomalies increase over time they
stretch the paradigm’s ability to explain them. Then, inexplicably,
there comes an epiphany—someone in the community realizes that
such “anomalies” challenge the very legitimacy of the paradigm itself.
This creates a crisis that is met with resistance from scientists that
continue to look to the dominant paradigm. 107
Such resistance is not negative, as it forces scientists not to be
lightly distracted. The resistance also means that when there is a
discovery it will lead to a “paradigm change [that] will penetrate
existing knowledge to the core.” 108 “Retooling,” in this framework,
“is an extravagance to be reserved for the occasion that demands it.”109
The time of crisis is when scientists focus their attention on the
anomalies. This focus has the effect of loosening expectations while
providing incremental data necessary for the paradigm shift.110
Resolution is possible by either reconfiguring the paradigm or
establishing a new paradigm that explains, predicts, and controls the
anomalous findings.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
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3. Eureka moment
After much debate, the crisis is solved as a scientist connects the
dots between the anomalies and the paradigm to discover that there is
a need for a new paradigm. This creates tension with those who have
invested their career in the old paradigm.
How the new paradigm forms remains a mystery. One who is
deeply immersed in the crisis connects the dots, “sometimes in the
middle of the night.” 111 Kuhn notes that scientists speak of “scales
falling from the eyes” or a “lightning flash” enabling them to see the
solution in a new way and for the first time. 112 They are “flashes of
intuition through which a new paradigm is born.” 113 Often, the
discoverers are young scientists, new to the field. They are “little
committed by prior practice to the traditional rules of normal science,
[and] are particularly likely to see that those rules no longer define a
playable game and to conceive another set that can replace them.” 114
“[W]hen paradigms change, the world itself changes with
them. . . . It is rather as if the professional community had been
suddenly transported to another planet where familiar objects are seen
in a different light and are joined by unfamiliar ones as well.” 115
4. Consolidation
The new paradigm eventually takes precedence as the community
coalesces with the new. The scientific community is effective at solving
the problems that its paradigm identifies, but it is not effective in
creating new approaches. 116 Those in the insular scientific community,
with their shared training and experience, are the sole possessors of
the rules of science and what counts as progress. When a community
decides that a revolution has occurred, there will be only one paradigm
that gains prominence and authority for defining the new problems
for science to investigate. 117

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 90.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 166.
Kuhn describes it this way:
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The scientists who lead the charge for a new paradigm when going
through the crisis are usually young or so new to the scientific field
that they are less committed than their colleagues to the worldview
and rules determined by the old paradigm. 118 Charles Darwin
expressed that his findings would have difficulty being accepted by his
colleagues: “I look with confidence to the future,” he stated, “to
young and rising naturalists, who will be able to view both sides of the
question with impartiality.” 119 It does take time, often a generation,
for the old paradigm to lose its influence.
Scientists who operated under the old paradigm throughout their
entire careers are loath to give it up. “The transfer of allegiance from
paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience that cannot be
forced.” 120 Despite the new paradigm’s ability to solve the crisis and
the objective proof that it does so, it remains very difficult to convince
members of the community to shift paradigms. Therefore, the process
of switching allegiances is gradual. There is no single argument that
is persuasive. 121
The triumphant group supporting the new paradigm within the
scientific community gets to be on the edge of progress “and they are
in an excellent position to make certain that future members of their
community will see past history in the same way.” 122 The repudiation
of a past paradigm means that it is no longer “a fit subject for
professional scrutiny” and all previous works based on that paradigm
are of no use. 123 This “drastic distortion in the scientist’s perception of

When, in the development of a natural science, an individual or group first produces a
synthesis able to attract most of the next generation’s practitioners, the older schools
gradually disappear. In part their disappearance is caused by their members’ conversion to
the new paradigm. But there are always some men who cling to one or another of the older
views, and they are simply read out of the profession, which thereafter ignores their work.
The new paradigm implies a new and more rigid definition of the field. Those unwilling or
unable to accommodate their work to it must proceed in isolation or attach themselves to
some other group.
Id. at 18–19.
118. Id. at 144.
119. Id. at 151 (quoting 2 CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 295–96 (6th
ed. 1889).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 155–56.
122. Id. at 166.
123. Id. at 167.
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his discipline’s past” makes the member of the scientific community a
“victim of a history rewritten by the powers that be.” 124
E. The Legal Revolution
Kuhn’s conceptual framework for evaluating what takes place in a
scientific revolution will assist in evaluating the legal revolution on the
place of religion in the law. In law, as in the scientific context, there
are established paradigms wherein the law sees the world through such
a certain lens. The current legal paradigm has placed religion in a
special status where there is a rebuttable presumption that religion,
beliefs, and practice, will be accommodated as much as possible, but
only within reasonable limits.
However, arguments are now being advanced that religion is not
special, 125 or, if it is special, such “distinctiveness provides reasons for
not tolerating it.” 126 Such arguments would take away the special
accommodations given to religion. One of the galvanizing issues for
those against religion’s unique treatment is the religious norm
regarding human sexuality that defines marriage as being limited to
one man and one woman. This religious norm is seen as repugnant
and not worthy of legal accommodation. The new legal position is so
different from the current legal paradigm on religion that it is
revolutionary.
The opposition to TWU’s law school proposal clearly illustrates
that the legal revolution on the status of religion is now in the crisis
stage. 127 There is a significant group within the legal profession that
would deny TWU’s right to rely upon the current legal paradigm on
religion. 128 For lack of a better term I will label the group “the anti-

124. Id.
125. Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special? 79 U. CHI. L. REV.
1351 (2012).
126. NEHUSHTAN, supra note 95, at 191.
127. While the TWU case is Canadian, I suggest the same principles are at stake for the
legal profession in every liberal democratic country.
128. For example, The Schulich School of Law Outlaw Society, in its factum at the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal (2015 C.A. No. 438894), argued, at paragraphs 29–31, that “the fact
that TWU is not subject to the Charter is irrelevant.” In other words, the current paradigm that
exempts private religious universities from Charter scrutiny since the Charter only applies to
government means nothing. The law, therefore, is apparently immaterial because “Charter
values” of “equality and respect for human dignity” trump.
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TWU group.” 129 This anti-TWU group advocates for a new paradigm
that takes away religious accommodation, as historically
understood, 130 especially when religious belief and practice are at odds
with its own norm on human sexuality. 131 This anti-religion faction has
been highly influenced by legal academics who have advocated this
position for a number of years. 132

129. By using the term “anti-TWU group” I am not meaning it in a disparaging manner.
It is descriptive. This group of academics and legal professionals are of the view that TWU
represents the old bigotry of years gone by. They see TWU as not only anachronistic in its
religious beliefs and practices but somehow dangerous to liberal democracy. This is most
unfortunate as there is every indication that TWU and its graduates have been exemplary in
providing university education and service. The Law Society of B.C. conducted its own
investigation into whether TWU graduates were involved in discriminatory conduct at BC’s
three public law schools. They came up empty. What they did find from the University of Victoria
was that the 2011 gold medalist was a former TWU student. (Memorandum from Policy and
Legal Servs. Dept. to The Benchers (Mar. 31, 2014). The fact that the Law Society felt that was
even necessary shows, in my view, a stereotypical anti-religious bias against TWU. It is reasonable
to imagine the public outcry if a similar investigation was conducted on graduates of B.C. public
universities. “Anti-TWU group” seems therefore appropriate but it is indicative of all academics
and legal professionals who wish to expunge from the law any semblance of traditional
protections given to religion in the law that TWU has been relying on in its defense.
130. The justices of the Ontario Division Court challenged the argument that TWU’s
discriminatory Covenant is entitled to the protection of exemptions in human rights legislation.
Said the Court, “discrimination is still discrimination, regardless of whether it is unlawful. The
fact that, for policy reasons, a Provincial Legislature has chosen not to make certain acts of
discrimination actionable under human rights legislation does not mean that those acts are any
less discriminatory. The Community Covenant, by its own terms, constitutes a prejudicial
treatment of different categories of people. It is, therefore, by its very nature, discriminatory.”
Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2015] 126 O.R. 3d 1, para. 108 (Can.).
131. Paul Bramadat, Managing and Imagining Religion in Canada from the Top and the
Bottom: 15 Years After, in BENJAMIN L. BERGER AND RICHARD MOON, RELIGION AND THE
EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 67 (2016), describes the opposition to TWU law school on
the basis that “the covenant: a) discriminates against individuals engaged in lawful sexual
activities, b) is not in keeping with the ostensibly secular professional standards governing other
law programmes and legal societies in Canada, and c) is contrary to the spirit and the letter of
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms that protects same-sex relationships.”
132. See e.g., Robert Wintemute, Religion vs. Sexual Orientation: A Clash of Human
Rights? 1 J.L. & EQUAL. 125 (2002); MacDougall, supra note 36; Bruce MacDougall & Donn
Short, Religion-based Claims for Impinging on Queer Citizenship, 33 DALHOUSIE L.J. 133
(2010); Elaine Craig, The Case for the Federation of Law Societies Rejecting Trinity Western
University’s Proposed Law Degree Program, 25 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 148 (2013) [hereinafter
Craig, Rejecting Trinity Western’s Proposal]; Elaine Craig, TWU Law: A Reply to Proponents of
Approval, 37 DALHOUSIE L.J. 621 (2014) [hereinafter Craig, TWU Law].
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As evidenced by the decisions on TWU in the Supreme Courts of
Nova Scotia 133 and British Columbia, 134 there yet remains, at least
within the judiciary, some allegiance to religion’s special legal status as
historically understood. Their decisions on TWU suggest that the
proposal of the new paradigm is still too radical a departure from the
law. However, even the judiciary is not unified, as evidenced by the
decisions of the Ontario Divisional Court 135 and the Ontario Court of
Appeal 136 against TWU.
If this legal revolution against religion travels on the same
trajectory that scientific revolutions have in the past, there are a
number of long-term implications that need to be considered. This
Section will outline the legal revolution on religion and consider
its implications.
1. The paradigm: religion is special and should be accommodated
We have already established that Canadian law treats religion as
special. However, it is worthwhile to step back and consider just how
widespread the accommodation of religion remains in Canadian law.
Religion is accommodated in a myriad of legal statutes and judicial
decisions. Consider that human rights legislation continues to allow
religious communities to discriminate in their hiring practices based
upon their religious beliefs and practices. 137 Provincial legal regimes
also recognize religion in such matters as providing for special
legislation for the ownership of land 138 and numerous special religious
exemptions, including exemptions from:
•
•

consumption or sales tax on religious literature 139
property tax 140

133. Trinity W. Univ. v. N.S. Barristers’ Soc’y, 2015 NSSC 25, [2015] N.S.J. No. 32
(Can.); N.S. Barristers’ Soc’y v. Trinity W. Univ., 2016 NSCA 59 (Can.)
134. Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [2015] B.C.J. No. 2697 (Can.); Trinity W.
Univ. v. Law Soc’y of B.C., 2016 BCCA 423 (Can.).
135. Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 126 O.R. 3d 1; Trinity W. Univ. v. Law
Soc’y of Upper Can., 2016 ONCA 518 (Can.).
136. Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 2016 ONCA 518 (Can.).
137. Human Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c 214, s. 6(c)(ii) (Can.).
138. E.g., Religious Congregations and Societies Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c 395 (Can.).
139. Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c E-15, Sched. III, Part III, s. 1 (Can.).
140. E.g., Assessment Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c 23, s. 5(1)(b) (Can.).
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regular school activities for religious observance141
entertainment tax 142
having photographs taken for gun licenses143
having to eat regular food in prisons. 144

One of the better-known special treatments of religion is found in
Canada’s charity law, which allows religious organizations to receive
registered charitable status and the consequent charitable tax donation
privileges for the advancement of religion. 145 Further, religious views
on marriage were protected when the Income Tax Act was amended
to shield religious charities from tax penalties due to exercising their
religious freedom on the issue of same-sex marriage. 146
These examples show that Canadian law, as with the law in most
Western democracies, is saturated with religious accommodation.
That is the default position, or in other words, the current legal
paradigm regarding religion. Not only have religious beliefs been
protected, but religious acts based on those beliefs have also been
protected. Certainly within the confines of religious communities,
even when their religious enterprises entered the “public sphere,” the
law has been loath to interfere except in the rarest of circumstances.
2. The paradigm under siege
The legal paradigm that presumes religion is special and ought to
be accommodated is now challenged by legal academics and has
erupted into a robust debate. 147 An increasing chorus suggests that

141. Schools Act, 1997, S.N.L. 1997 c S-12.2, s. 10 (Can.).
142. City of St. John’s Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c C-17, s. 271(1) (Can.).
143. Firearms Licences Regulations, SOR/98-199, s. 14 (2) (Can.).
144. Correctional Services Act, S.N.S. 2005, c 37, s. 58(2) (Can.).
145. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 1 (5th Supp.) (Can.), does not define what is
charitable. The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) must therefore rely on the common law
definition, which sets out the four heads of charity including the advancement of religion, most
recently confirmed in the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Vancouver Soc’y of Immigrant
& Visible Minority Women v. Minister of Nat’l Revenue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 10, paras. 42,
144 (Can.).
146. R.S.C. 1985, c 1 at s. 149.1(6.21). This was a consequential amendment to the Civil
Marriage Act, necessitated by challenges threatened to religious communities by certain activists
at the time.
147. Tore Lindholm & W. Cole Durham, Do We Need the Right to Freedom of Religion
or Belief (May 25, 2011) (paper presented at the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, Oslo,
Norway); Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2008); Brian Leiter,
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religion, as a constitutionally protected right, is redundant, and argues
that there are other constitutional protections religion could avail itself
of, such as freedom of association and freedom of speech. 148 In fact,
Foundations of Religious Liberty: Toleration or Respect?, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 935 (2010);
Dieter Grimm, Conflicts Between General Laws and Religious Norms, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2369
(2009);
Micah
Schwartzman,
What
if
Religion
Isn’t
Special,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1992090; Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair To Give Religion Special
Treatment?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 571, (2006); Andrew Koppelman, How Shall I Praise Thee?
Brian Leiter on Respect for Religion, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 961 (2010); Steven G. Gey, Why Is
Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75 (1990); E. Gregory Wallace, Justifying Religious
Freedom: The Western Tradition, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 485 (2009); Iain T. Benson, The Attack
on Western Religions by Western Law: Re-Framing Pluralism, Liberalism and Diversity (Sept. 20,
2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2328825; Iain Benson, Notes Towards a (Re)definition of the
Secular 33 U.B.C. L. REV. 519 (2000); Iain Benson, Physicians and Marriage Commissioners:
Accommodation of Differing Beliefs in a Free and Democratic Society, 66 ADVOCATE 747 (2008);
Iain Benson, The Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Canada: Challenges and Opportunities,
21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 111 (2007); Mike Madden, Second Among Equals?: Understanding the
Short Shrift that Freedom of Religion Is Receiving in Canadian Jurisprudence, 7 L. & EQUALITY
55 (2010); Jeremy Webber, The Irreducibly Religious Content of Freedom of Religion, in
DIVERSITY AND EQUALITY: THE CHANGING FRAMEWORK OF FREEDOM IN CANADA 178
(Avigail Eisenberg ed., 2006); Webber, supra note 23, at 26; Benjamin L. Berger, The Cultural
Limits of Legal Tolerance, 21 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 245 (2008); Benjamin Berger, The Limits of
Belief: Freedom of Religion, Secularism, and the Liberal State, 17 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 39 (2002);
Benjamin L. Berger, Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture, in LAW AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN
CANADA 264 (Richard Moon ed., 2008); Paul Horwitz, The Sources and Limits of Freedom of
Religion in a Liberal Democracy: Section 2(a) and Beyond, 54 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1
(1996); Jonathan Chaplin, Beyond Liberal Restraint: Defending Religiously-Based Arguments in
Law and Public Policy, 33 U.B.C. L. REV. 617 (2000); Lorenzo Zucca, The Place of Religion in
Constitutional Goods, 22 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 205 (2009); Bryan Thomas, Secular Law and
Inscrutable Faith: Religious Freedom, Freedom of Conscience, and the Law’s Epistemology (Nov.
25, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1275351; Avihay Dorfman,
Freedom of Religion, 21 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 279 (2008); Timothy Macklem, Faith as a Secular
Value, 45 MCGILL L.J. 1 (2000); Anthony Ellis, What Is Special About Religion?, 25 L. & PHIL.
219 (2006); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience:
The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994);
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE
CONSTITUTION (2007); PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE
CONSTITUTION (2011); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF
AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty
as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313 (1996); Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk:
The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1869 (2009) (book review); Steven D.
Smith, Unprincipled Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 497 (1996); Steven D.
Smith, Is a Coherent Theory of Religious Freedom Possible?, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 73 (1998);
Kent Greenawalt, Moral and Religious Convictions As Categories For Special Treatment: The
Exemption Strategy, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1605 (2007).
148. Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71,
72 (2001).
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scholar Brian Leiter argues that there is no moral reason to continue
to honor religion’s special legal status. 149 Academics are not alone in
those views.
Judges are also openly questioning the special status given to
religion. In his dissenting judgment in Hutterian Brethren of Wilson
Colony, Justice LeBel observed that the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of religion has been difficult to interpret and apply. 150 He
stated, “[p]erhaps, courts will never be able to explain in a complete
and satisfactory manner the meaning of religion for the purposes of
the Charter.” 151 He went on to opine that other Charter rights such
as freedom of opinion, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression,
and freedom of association could have been sufficient to protect
religious freedom, but that since freedom of religion was in the
Charter it “must be given meaning and effect.” 152
Justice LeBel’s musing that religion could have been protected by
other constitutional freedoms, with no need for a specific religious
constitutional head, suggests that religious freedom is an unnecessary
appendage rather than a foundational principle of our democratic
state. As noted above, it was the struggle to obtain religious freedom
that had a profound impact on the creation of our Western democratic
traditions. A strong argument can be made that a proper
understanding of religious protection is the opposite of what Justice
LeBel suggests. In that sense, Justice LeBel may have put the cart
before the horse. History suggests that it was the accommodation of
religious belief and practice that gave rise to freedom of opinion,
conscience, expression, association, and assembly. Justice Ivan Rand153
and former Chief Justice Brian Dickson 154 understood that historical
position during their respective tenures on the Court.
Justice LeBel’s position that courts may not be able to completely
understand religion is particularly pronounced by academics and the

149. LEITER, supra note 86.
150. Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (Can.).
151. Id. at para. 180.
152. Id.
153. Rand noted, in Saumur v. Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 (Can.) (“From 1760,
therefore, to the present moment religious freedom has, in our legal system, been recognized as
a principle of fundamental character.”).
154. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 346–47 (Can.) (“Religious belief
and practice are historically prototypical and, in many ways, paradigmatic of conscientiously held
beliefs and manifestations and are therefore protected by the Charter.”).
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legal profession’s governing bodies over the issue of human sexuality.
The issue in the TWU case is whether a private religious institution (a
university, in this case) is allowed to maintain the religious belief and
practice that marriage is between one man and one woman.
3. Religion and sex
Religions—particularly those within the Judeo-Christian
worldview—have profoundly influenced our legal and moral norms.
Such norms include human sexuality. TWU has consistently
maintained a traditional Christian understanding of human nature.
Under this understanding, humankind has a binary nature of equal
importance: male and female. That binary understanding has a long
theological history. At the beginning of human life on earth, which
Christians believe was recorded in the ancient Book of Genesis, 155 God
created male and female: “So God created man in His own image; in
the image of God He created him; male and female He created
them.” 156 Further, the Bible states, “[t]herefore a man shall leave his
father and mother and be joined to his wife, and they shall become
one flesh.” 157 In the Christian tradition, this biblical passage is widely
understood to be God’s establishment of the institution of marriage.
Jesus of Nazareth further expounded upon this foundational
worldview by unequivocally stating,
And He answered and said to them, “Have you not read that He
who made them at the beginning made them male and female,” and
said, “For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be
joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh? So then, they
are no longer two but one flesh. Therefore what God has joined
together, let not man separate.” 158

Western democracies and their laws were once in agreement with
that Judeo-Christian moral norm of the heterosexual monogamous
relationship of marriage. 159 It was “a society of shared social values

155. Genesis is the first book of the Christian and Jewish Bibles.
156. Genesis 1:27 (New King James).
157. Genesis 2:24.
158. Matthew 19:4–6.
159. Don S. Browning, Family Law and Christian Jurisprudence, in CHRISTIANITY AND
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 169–82 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2008); see WITTE,
JR., supra note 96; see also Hyde v. Hyde [1866] 1 P. & D. 130, 133 (Eng.).
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where marriage and religion were thought to be inseparable.” 160 This
is no longer the case. The late 20th and early 21st centuries marked a
turning point. No longer were the religious moral norms in sync with
the law regarding sexuality and marriage. 161 The advance of equality
claims based on sexual orientation and the redefinition of marriage
called into question the place of religious influence in law and
public policy.
The “elephant in the room,” so to speak, with the TWU case is
the propriety of a religious community maintaining a traditional sexual
norm in its operation of a “public” institution. While there have been
other cases that dealt with the right of a religious charity to enforce a
lifestyle and faith commitment on its employees, such as Christian
Horizons, 162 the TWU case has gone beyond that. TWU requires not
only its employees but also its students—in other words, its
“clientele”—to adhere to its strict moral view on sexuality.
This is not unusual. It has been the practice of many religious
universities since their inception. 163 In 2001, the SCC recognized this
practice as a part of religious freedom. The SCC was able to justify
TWU’s religious freedom to mean “that a homosexual student would
not be tempted to apply for admission, and could only sign the socalled student contract at a considerable personal cost” because

What, then, is the nature of this institution as understood in Christendom? Its incidents may
vary in different countries, but what are its essential elements and invariable features? If it be of
common acceptance and existence, it must needs have (however varied in different countries in
its minor incidents) some pervading identity and universal basis. I conceive that marriage, as
understood in Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the voluntary union for life of
one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others.
160. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, para. 22 (Can.).
161. SYLVAIN LAROCQUE, GAY MARRIAGE: THE STORY OF A CANADIAN SOCIAL
REVOLUTION (2006).
162. Ont. Human Rights Comm’n v. Christian Horizons, [2010] 102 O.R. 3d 267 (Can.).
163. Religious universities do not see themselves as simply peddling knowledge for
knowledge’s sake but concerned with educating the individual “for the purpose of illuminating
the Divine.” Emily Longshore, Student Conduct Codes at Religious Affiliated Institutions:
Fostering Growth, U.S.C. SCHOLAR COMMONS (2015). This is evident in many university codes
such as Baylor University’s sexual conduct policy, BU-PP 031, wherein it is stated, “Baylor will
be guided by the biblical understanding that human sexuality is a gift from God and that physical
sexual intimacy is to be expressed in the context of marital fidelity.” BAYLOR, SEXUAL CONDUCT:
BU-PP 031 (May 15, 2015), https://www.baylor.edu/content/services/document.php
?id=39247); see Church Educational System Honor Code, BYU.EDU (Nov. 9, 2015),
https://policy.byu.edu/view/index.php?p=26 (stating that Brigham Young University students
are expected to “[l]ive a chaste and virtuous life”).
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“TWU is not for everybody; it is designed to address the needs of
people who share a number of religious convictions.” 164 As a private
institution, TWU is exempted, in part, “from the British Columbia
human rights legislation and to which the Charter does not apply.” 165
It was therefore inconceivable for the SCC to require a section 15
equality rights analysis on the voluntary adoption of a code of conduct
based on a person’s own religious beliefs in a private institution. Such
a position “would be inconsistent with freedom of conscience and
religion, which co-exist with the right to equality.” 166 In other words,
it would be against the legal paradigm of religious freedom to deny
TWU its accreditation based on its code of conduct.
Canadian jurisprudence acted as a jealous mistress by ensuring that
religion and religious freedom maintained special status. This was
evident in the pre-Charter jurisprudence 167 and was greatly enhanced
during the early years of the Charter with the elimination of stateimposed religious holy days 168 and with the accommodation of
religious practice in a number of areas including the workplace, 169 the
school, 170 and condominiums. 171 The religious paradigm worked well
with the Charter. However, the paradigm became strained in trying
to reconcile religious freedom and human sexuality interests.
When the SCC recognized the constitutional protection of
“sexual orientation” as an analogous ground 172 in section 15 of the
Charter, although a welcome relief for the LGBTQ community, it
resulted in friction between sexual orientation and religion. The
drafters of the Charter were aware of the anticipated widespread
challenges that the addition of “sexual orientation” as a protected
ground from discrimination was going to have. They decided not to

164. Trinity W. Univ. v. B.C. Coll. of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, para.
25 (Can.).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Saumur v. City of Que., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, 329 (Can.).
168. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can.).
169. Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 (Can.).
170. Multani v. Comm’n scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (Can.).
171. Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (Can.).
172. Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (Can.).

1167

2.BUSSEY.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/14/2016 3:05 PM

2016

include sexual orientation but drafted the language so that the courts
would deal with it in due course. 173
Over the ensuing years, the SCC has been navigating uncharted
waters by trying to juggle three major constitutional principles:
protection of religion, protection of sexual orientation, and the
constitutional doctrine that there is no hierarchy of rights. 174 The
growing consensus among legal scholars is that the SCC’s attempt to
balance the interests to date has been trying to “square the circle.”175
This reconciliation attempt has been difficult, and it would appear that
the future will not be any easier. The inconsistencies of affirming
sexual equality while at the same time respecting religious pluralism
without passing judgment on the religious norms of sexuality appear
to have come to a head in the TWU law school case.
The SCC will be faced with a crucial decision: whether to reject
its long-held no-hierarchy principle and allow equality or religion to
trump the other, or to maintain the status quo by protecting both
religious freedom and equality rights while recognizing that there will
be, by necessity, a palpable dissonance on the views and practices of
human sexuality, and that such differences must be respected in a
plural and liberal democratic society. This Article argues that it is the
latter position that makes the most sense going forward. 176

173. Barry L. Strayer, was Assistant Deputy Minister of Justice under the Pierre E. Trudeau
government that brought in the Charter. Strayer was instrumental in the design of the Charter.
He writes, “The addition of the words “in particular” [of s.15] was thought to make the grounds
of discrimination open-ended: it left open the possibility that non-enumerated grounds could
also be found by the courts in the future, such as sexual orientation and matters on which there
was no consensus in 1981.” BARRY L. STRAYER CANADA’S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
265 (2013).
174. Dagenais v. Can. Broad. Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, 877 (Can.).
175. Richard Moon, Sexual Orientation Equality and Religious Freedom in the Public
Schools: A Comment on Trinity Western University v. B.C. College of Teachers and Chamberlain
v. Surrey School Board District 36, 8 REV. CONST. STUD. 228, 283 (2003).
176. This is precisely the view expressed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Trinity
W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of B.C., 2016 BCCA 423, para. 193:
A society that does not admit of and accommodate differences cannot be a free and
democratic society—one in which its citizens are free to think, to disagree, to debate and
to challenge the accepted view without fear of reprisal. This case demonstrates that a wellintentioned majority acting in the name of tolerance and liberalism, can, if unchecked,
impose its views on the minority in a manner that is in itself intolerant and illiberal.
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4. Religion as nemesis
When considered from a macro perspective, religious scruples
about sex outside of the traditional institution of marriage have
become but a whimper in today’s cultural milieu of Western
democracies. Consider the fact that censorship of movies,
pornography, bathhouses, and prostitution based upon religious
norms have become virtually a non-issue. 177 In the truest sense, the
attitude has become “live and let live.” As long as there is mutual
consent on any sexual adventure involving more than one person,
“you do your thing and I’ll do mine” sums up contemporary society.
Therefore, it seems odd that such a liberal and permissive
democratic society would have government actors who find it
necessary to investigate, criticize, and demand a private religious
university178 to put away its voluntary code of conduct requirement
that its student body agree to abide by a traditional moral code on sex.
No one is forced to attend. No ongoing government support is given
to the institution. No one suggests that the quality of education is
anything but exemplary. The graduates in other disciplines, such as
education, have not been found to discriminate against the LGBTQ
community. Yet, the legal profession insists that TWU law school not

177. Emile Durkheim was convinced that religion was “one of the forces that create within
individuals a sense of obligation to adhere to society’s demands,” noted ANNE HENDERSHOTT,
THE POLITICS OF DEVIANCE 2 (2002). However, Hendershott describes the fact that concept
of deviance is no longer part of our social lexicon. “The commitment to egalitarianism, along
with a growing reluctance to judge the behaviour of others, has made discussions of deviance
obsolete.” Id. at 3. Yet Hendershott concludes her work with the provocative statement,
“Perhaps we will begin to recognize that a society that continues to redefine deviance as disease,
or refuses to acknowledge and negatively sanction the deviant acts our common sense tells us
are destructive, is a society that has lost the capacity to confront evil that has a capacity to
dehumanize us all.” Id. at 163.
178. Even though TWU is private, it is also a charity. Some suggest that, because of its
charitable status, TWU is a public actor that relies on the state and therefore should follow public
norms. For an example of this type of reasoning see Saul Templeton, Re-Framing the Trinity
Western University Debate: Tax, Trans and Intersex Issues, 40 L. MATTERS 40 (2015),
http://www.cba-alberta.org/Publications-Resources/Resources/Law-Matters/Law-MattersSummer-2015-Issue/Re-Framing-the-Trinity-Western-University-Debate. However, the fact
that a religious institution is a charity, or that it is issuing state recognized degrees, or that it
receives other state acknowledgement does not change the analysis; it is still entitled to Charter
protection. Otherwise, there is no end where such an argument may go—for example, the state
recognizes TWU’s property rights and will send in police to protect it from violence—is that
state recognition contingent upon TWU’s acceptance of public norms on marriage? It runs into
the absurd.
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be accredited. Why? There are a couple of rational explanations: First,
TWU’s Covenant creates an inequality of access to legal education
against the LGBTQ community. However, the BCCA agreed with the
Federation’s finding that was not the case. 179 Second, the religious
belief regarding traditional marriage has become such a controversial
issue that the legal community is embarrassed to have a bona fide law
school that stands for that belief in its midst. 180 Finally, there is an
inherent harm in recognition of such a law school. 181 Such harm may
be seen as dignitary harm resulting from being offended. 182 However,
as the BCCA noted, “there is no Charter or other legal right to be
free from views that offend and contradict an individual’s strongly
held beliefs….” 183
So offensive is the traditional marriage belief and practice of TWU
that law societies are willing to ignore a 2001 SCC ruling that remains
authoritative in the opinion of BC Chief Justice Hinkson. 184 The
Charter does not apply, nor does the applicable human rights
legislation. 185 Yet three law societies insist that they do, and these law
societies are championed to carry on the fight by every common-law
faculty across the country.

179. Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of B.C., 2016 BCCA 423, at paras. 171–180 (Can.).
180. Justice Campbell suggests in Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of B.C., 2015 NSSC 25,
paragraph 255 (Can.) that perhaps the NSBS “is motivated by the question, ‘What will people
think?’ If the NSBS allows students from a law school that discriminates against LGB people it
will appear hypocritical in light of its strong advocacy for equality rights.”
181. Consider that running throughout the litigation the law societies have argued that if
they accredit TWU they would be seen as endorsing TWU’s discriminatory practices. The
Ontario Divisional Court stated that accreditation would be condoning discrimination which
“can be ever much as harmful as the act of discrimination itself.” Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y
of Upper Can., 2015 ONSC 4250, para. 116 (Can.).
182. Justice MacPherson of the Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Society of B.C., 2016 ONCA 518,
at paragraph 119 (Can.), held that the Covenant “is deeply discriminatory to the LGBTQ
community, and it hurts.”
183. Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of B.C., 2016 BCCA 423, at para. 188 (Can.). Also the
BCCA noted that such fear of endorsement makes little practical sense since “no religious faculty
of any kind could be approved. Licensing of religious care facilities and hospitals would also fall
into question.”
184. Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of B.C., 2015 BCSC 2326, [2015] B.C.J. No. 2697,
paras. 78, 90 (Can.).
185. Trinity W. Univ. v. B.C. Coll. of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, para.
25 (Can.).
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In her piece Equality’s Nemesis?, 186 Queen’s University law
professor Beverley Baines argues for an interventionist, three-pronged
approach to deal with religion and sex equality. While she argues in
the context of women’s equality, her argument that religion is
equality’s nemesis is applicable to equality rights generally. Her first
assertion is that there should be a hierarchy of rights wherein religious
and cultural claims are subject to the guarantee of equality. 187 She
stated, “no reason exists to immunize [religious societies] from the
constitutional guarantee of sex equality.” 188 Second, she asserted that
religious communities should operate jointly with the state in certain
areas. 189 If a member of the religious community does not have his or
her equality right accepted by the religious community, then he or she
can appeal to the state for redress forcing the religious community to
permit his or her right. 190 Her third argument advocates the
privatization of religion. Since religious communities are private by
nature, they should not be given any special protections such as those
found in the Charter. 191 Rather, religious communities should rely on
the freedoms of expression and association. Unfortunately, this
argument ignores the fact that religion is an enumerated ground in
section 15 of the Charter and therefore has its own equality rights.
Framing religion as equality’s nemesis seems to be a stretch, given
its long sociopolitical history in the evolution of human rights.192
However, the diminution of religion is beginning to take shape.
Baines’s three-pronged approach is not too far from becoming reality.
In the SCC case Loyola High School, 193 Justice Abella asked the counsel
for the private Catholic school whether a religious community is
exempt from having to teach a course that it says violates its religious
freedom when that religion’s “ethical framework” contradicts what
the Court considers “national values.” 194

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Beverley Baines, Equality’s Nemesis?, 5 J.L. & EQUALITY 57 (2006).
Id. at 76.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id. at 78.
JOHN WITTE, JR. & M. CHRISTIAN GREEN, RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
INTRODUCTION (2011).
193. Loyola High Sch. v. Quebec, 2015 SCC 12, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 613 (Can.).
194. Transcript of Loyola High School v. Quebec, Monday, Mar. 24, 2014, StenoTran, at
7, lines 16–22.
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Justice Abella wrote the majority decision and referenced
those values:
These shared values—equality, human rights and democracy—are
values the state always has a legitimate interest in promoting and
protecting. They enhance the conditions for integration and points
of civic solidarity by helping connect us despite our
differences. . . .This is what makes pluralism work . . . “[a]
multicultural multireligious society can only work . . . if people of all
groups understand and tolerate each other.” . . . Religious freedom
must therefore be understood in the context of a secular,
multicultural and democratic society with a strong interest in
protecting dignity and diversity, promoting equality, and ensuring
the vitality of a common belief in human rights. 195

The national values therefore are “equality, human rights and
democracy” and “a common belief in human rights.” The
groundwork is now set for future decisions to elaborate how those
values trump religious freedom. It would not be difficult to find
scenarios where national values may be at odds with long-held and
well-understood religious norms. 196 For example, consider the
struggle that religious communities face when hiring or firing
individuals who do not share their religious norms. Will the national
values of “equality” and “human rights” force such communities to
hire those who no longer believe and practice as the religious
employer? While there are exemptions for religious communities in
human rights legislation, courts have narrowed those exemptions
considerably. 197
For Justice Abella, these values enhance “integration” and “civic
solidarity” by ensuring that we connect despite our differences.198
There can be no doubt that a multicultural society needs to have
means of creating a civic understanding of mutual responsibilities.
Religious communities, by their nature, tend to be absolutist in their
truth claims, as Loyola demonstrated. 199 However, the legal profession

195. Loyola, 1 S.C.R. at para. 47 (citations omitted).
196. Consider, for example, that membership in the Roman Catholic clergy is limited to
unmarried men.
197. Ont. Human Rights Comm’n v. Christian Horizons, [2010] 102 O.R. 3d 267 (Can.);
Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (Can.).
198. Loyola, 1 S.C.R. at para. 47.
199. Loyola, as a Catholic institution, “continued to assert the right to teach Catholic
doctrine and ethics from a Catholic perspective.” Loyola, 1 S.C.R. at para. 31.
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and the media are increasingly scrutinizing that idea as they become
progressively intolerant of religious differences of religious
organizations as they operate in the “public sphere.”.
A hierarchy of rights implies a generally accepted norm as to which
right is to be above another. Such homogeneity of thought will be
difficult to obtain and maintain in a multicultural society. However,
some suggest that it ought to be tried. University of Windsor law
professor Richard Moon wrote:
It is unrealistic to expect the individual to leave her or his religious
beliefs or values behind when she or he enters public life. If religious
values are part of public debate and decision-making, then the values
of some individuals will lose out—for example, will not be included
in the curriculum. If we believe that this is consistent with religious
pluralism then we may have less sympathy for the demands of a
parent, based on religious belief, that his or her children not be
exposed to any affirmation of the value of same-sex relationships, or
for the claim of an individual, who is opposed to the conception of
human dignity or equality that informs the civic curriculum, to work
as a teacher, or for the claim to accreditation of a teacher training
program that affirms anti-gay/lesbian views. 200

According to Moon, the right of a religious parent would lose out.
In other writings, he is more emphatic when he says that public
commitment to sexual orientation equality (in public schools) “will
involve nothing less than a repudiation of the religious view that
homosexuality is sinful.” 201 It is one thing to make the argument that
homosexuality is not sinful, as Professor Moon suggests, but it
becomes problematic to require everyone else, by means of state
action, to accept that view. In other words, these are matters on which
reasonable people may disagree. As Voltaire is apocryphally purported
to have opined, “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the
death your right to say it.” 202 Or have we indeed come to the point
where the legal profession is of the view that there is only one view?

200. Moon, supra note 147, at 283–84.
201. Richard Moon, The Supreme Court of Canada’s Attempt to Reconcile Freedom of
Religion and Sexual Orientation in the Public Schools, in FAITH, POLITICS, AND SEXUAL
DIVERSITY IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 321, 338 (David Rayside & Clyde Wilcox
eds., 2011).
202. S.G. TALLENTYRE (pseudonym of Evelyn Beatrice Hall), THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE
199 (1906).
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In the 2001 TWU case, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé wrote a
dissenting opinion. “I am dismayed,” she wrote, “that at various
points in the history of this case the argument has been made that one
can separate condemnation of the ‘sexual sin’ of ‘homosexual
behaviour’ from intolerance of those with homosexual or bisexual
orientations. This position alleges that one can love the sinner, but
condemn the sin.” 203
In rejecting the “love the sinner and hate the sin” view, Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé agreed with the intervener EGALE, who argued
that “[r]equiring someone not to act in accordance with their identity
is harmful and cruel. It destroys the human spirit. Pressure to change
their behaviour and deny their sexual identity has proved
tremendously damaging to young persons seeking to come to terms
with their sexual orientation.” 204
The SCC affirmed Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s dissenting opinion
on this point in the context of the 2013 Whatcott case. 205 The court
reasoned that Mr. Whatcott’s flyer did not make a meaningful
distinction between sexual acts and sexual orientation, and that the
flyers’ condemnation of the sex acts was therefore hateful. 206 While the
court appears to have kept the distinction between the condemnation
of sexual acts and the condemnation of sexual orientation, it
nevertheless chills the environment for freedom of expression on the
issue because there is bound to be confusion over the court’s
interpretation. The court stated that “[g]enuine comments on sexual
activity are not likely to fall into the purview of a prohibition against
hate.” 207 However, confusion will naturally arise over what is
“genuine.” For example, the court said that if “Mr. Whatcott’s
message was that those who engage in sexual practices not leading to
procreation should not be hired as teachers or that such practices
should not be discussed as part of the school curriculum, his
expression would not implicate an identifiable group.” 208 But the
reality is that non-procreative sex acts are what a same-sex couple does.

203. Trinity W. Univ. v. B.C. Coll. of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, para.
69 (Can.).
204. Id.
205. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Comm’n) v. Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11, para.
176 (Can.).
206. Id. at para. 177.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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Therefore, focusing solely on non-procreative sex is implicating only
same-sex couples. Perhaps the court is saying, “you can use general
comments on non-procreative sex but just don’t link the dots to an
identifiable group.” I am not sure that is a sufficient distinction to
allow religious citizens the comfort to actively engage in such
conversations when they have to maintain such a tight and esoteric
distinction. The chilling effect of this decision remains.
Professor Bruce MacDougall, of the University of British
Columbia, stated, “[r]eligious ideology cannot be used to determine
what people who are not of that religion can do or how they should
lead their lives.” 209 The problem, of course, is that “religious ideology”
in a pluralistic society ought to be given the same right as any other
“ideology” in advancing a position in the public discourse. It is in the
process of deliberative democracy that society is able to establish its
norms. Even when there is a consensus, that does not mean that
debate suddenly stops. Public debate on issues must continue if we are
to remain free and democratic. That a particular opinion advanced in
public debate is rooted in a religious worldview should not prevent it
from being considered.
However, for some in the legal academy, the fact that marriage has
been redefined and religious communities had an opportunity to
participate in the public debate means that all further discussion must
cease. Religious communities must be silent. Such a posture makes no
room for the reality that religious communities differ and maintain the
traditional definition of marriage within their own sphere.
MacDougall further argues that religions should not be able to
maintain their religious views on marriage and sexuality even within
their own communities. In the footnote to the above statement,
he says:
In my opinion, [religious ideology] should not even be used to judge
those who are of that religious persuasion. Even children being
raised in a particular religious tradition should not be exposed to
ideology that excludes and refuses to accommodate homosexuality
in their education. The state has an interest in all education of the
young and this ideal should prevail. 210

209. Bruce MacDougall, The Celebration of Same-Sex Marriage, 32 OTTAWA L. REV. 235,
247–48 (2000).
210. Id. at 248 n.63.
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Suddenly the distinction between the “private” and “public”
sphere becomes obsolete when it comes to human sexuality. There is
no distinction. The public norm of human sexuality must prevail
because “the state has an interest.” There is then no allowance for the
individual to recognize the sovereignty of God in matters of sexuality;
instead, the sovereignty of the state is now supreme.211 It is a
totalitarian concept that rejects any notion of accommodation of
religious belief and practice as it affects sexual equality. MacDougall
argues, “[o]nce the religious characterization is removed from an issue
of racial or gender discrimination, the issue becomes much more
straightforward. So it should be with homosexuality.” 212
The problem with framing the issue this way is that it does not
present the complete picture. From the very beginning of human
experience, humanity has struggled over the issue of sovereignty
wherein states have demanded sole allegiance at the expense of the
individual conscience. Therefore, it is germane to the conversation to
consider that liberal democracies changed the absolutist state
paradigm to one where state sovereignty made provisions for religious
belief and practice. The special status given to religion was what made
other rights possible—it was “prototypical,” as noted above.
Virtually all of the “fundamental freedoms” had their origin in the
protection of religion and its practice. Therefore, to suggest that
religious views that do not accept nontraditional sexual norms are
somehow “religiously based negative animus” 213 and not worthy of
protection flies in the face of liberal democratic history and theoretical
thought. Rather, there is an anti-religious bias that refuses to accept

211. David L. Corbett, Freedom from Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation
Under Section 15 of the Charter: An Historical Review and Appraisal, in THE CHARTER AT
TWENTY: LAW AND PRACTICE 2002, at 415 (Debra M. McAllister & Adam M. Dodek eds.,
2002). David Corbett has characterized the tension between religion and sexual orientation as
“a struggle to protect our public policy from being infused with religious ideals for the purpose
of denying a particular and disapproved group their equal place within Canadian society. . . . It
is a conflict between the fundamental principles of our secular state – the Rule of Law, the
principle of equality, and the primacy of the Constitution on the one hand, and a religiously
based negative animus against homosexuality on the other.”
212. Bruce MacDougall, Silence in the Classroom: Limits on Homosexual Expression and
Visibility in Education and the Privileging of Homophobic Religious Ideology, 61 SASK. L. REV. 41,
78 (1998).
213. Corbett, supra note 211, at 415.
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the reality of religion’s legal protection on matters of sexuality.
Religion is now seen as the nemesis that must be eliminated.
5. The crisis
The legal system is faced with two opposing views of religion’s
place in the law. One demands the traditional protection of religion;
the other rejects religion’s place in the law. The TWU case is ground
zero in the crisis.
a. Trinity Western University’s law school proposal. TWU’s law
school submission to the Federation of the Law Societies of Canada
took the Canadian legal community by storm. It raised considerable
opposition among academics, 214 the Canadian Council of Law Deans
(CCLD), 215 the Canadian Bar Association, 216 law students, and major
newspapers such as The Globe and Mail. 217 Given that TWU has

214. See Craig, Rejecting Trinity Western’s Proposal, supra note 132; Dianne Pothier, An
Argument Against Accreditation of Trinity Western University’s Proposed Law School, 23 CONST.
F., no. 1, 2014, at 1; Craig, TWU Law, supra note 132; Jeremy Webber, Religion vs. Equality,
VANCOUVER SUN (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.vancouversun.com/life/Opinion+Religion
+equality/9715430/story.html. But see Dwight Newman, On the Trinity Western University
Controversy: An Argument for a Christian Law School in Canada, 22 CONST. F., no. 3, 2013, at
1; Thomas M.J. Bateman, Trinity Western University’s Law School and the Associational
Dimension of Religious Freedom: Toward Comprehensive Liberalism, 66 U.N.B. L.J. 78 (2015);
Mark A. Witten, Tracking Secularism: Freedom of Religion, Education, and the Trinity Western
University Law School Dispute, 79 SASK. L. REV. 215 (2016).
215. Letter from Bill Flanagan, President of the Canadian Council of Law Deans, to John
J.L. Hunter & Gerald R. Tremblay, Federation of Canadian Law Societies (Nov. 20, 2012),
where he said in part,
The covenant specifically contemplates that gay, lesbian or bisexual students may be
subject to disciplinary measures including expulsion. This is a matter of great concern
for all the members of the CCLD. Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is
unlawful in Canada and fundamentally at odds with the core values of all Canadian
law schools. We would urge the Federation to investigate whether TWU’s covenant
is inconsistent with federal or provincial law. We would also urge the Federation to
consider this covenant and its intentionally discriminatory impact on gay, lesbian and
bi-sexual students when evaluating TWU’s application to establish an approved
common law program.
216. Letter from Robert C. Brun, Q.C., President of the CBA, to Gerald R. Tremblay,
President, Federation of the Law Societies of Canada (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.
outonbayst.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/CoverLetter_DocumentPackage.pdf.
217. Editorial, No gay-free law school should stand in Canada, GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 7,
2013), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/editorials/no-gay-free-law-schoolshould-stand-in-canada/article8356107/.
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decided to appeal the Ontario Court of Appeal decision 218 the SCC
will, yet again, have to decide if TWU can maintain its religious
identity. In 2001, the SCC decided that “TWU is not for
everybody” 219 and had the right to limit students to those who would
live in accordance with its religious requirements. In other words,
when the law allows a religious institution to be exempt from a general
norm, the law is showing a “tolerance of indifference,” 220 as described
by Professor Benjamin Berger. Thus, the SCC’s decision in 2001 may
be described as the law being tolerant of a religious university and
granting state-recognized degrees, while maintaining a campus with
traditional sexual norms based on its religious beliefs. 221 Such tolerance
was “based on the implicit judgment that the cultural differences
found in the ‘tolerated’ [i.e. TWU] really ought not to bother
the law.” 222
Given the robust opposition to TWU’s law school proposal that
“tolerance of indifference” toward the religious freedom right of
TWU appears to have shifted in a large segment of the legal profession
since 2001. The emphasis on equality rights at the expense of religious
freedom considerations, among legal academics and the legal
profession, is ample reason to be concerned that the SCC may decide
the TWU law school case differently from its 2001 TWU education
degree case.
It is not that the law has changed, which will be discussed below,
as much as the fact that the legal culture has changed. In essence, it is
the legal culture’s changing beliefs toward religion and how society
should accommodate those religious beliefs that the legal profession
has deemed repugnant. That legal bias is at the heart of the debate
over TWU’s School of Law. It is that bias that is about to profoundly
alter the fundamental freedom of religion, which is a pillar of liberal
democratic society, and that will weaken the very fabric of human
rights in the long term.

218. Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 2016 ONCA 518 (Can.).
219. Trinity W. Univ. v. B.C. Coll. of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, para.
25 (Can.).
220. BENJAMIN L. BERGER, LAW’S RELIGION: RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE AND THE CLAIMS
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 112–32 (2015).
221. Coll. of Teachers, 1 S.C.R. 772.
222. BERGER, supra note 220, at 126.
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Up until the TWU law school case, religious organizations, such
as religious universities, carried out their public purpose underneath
the constitutional protective shield of religious freedom. That is why
in 2001 the SCC could say without hesitation that “TWU is not for
everybody; it is designed to address the needs of people who share a
number of religious convictions.” 223 And that, “The diversity of
Canadian society is partly reflected in the multiple religious
organizations that mark the societal landscape and this diversity of
views should be respected.” 224 The SCC was emphatic that the B.C.
College of Teachers denial of accreditation was denied TWU “the
right of full participation in society.” 225
The aggressive stance of the legal academy 226 and the legal
profession against TWU’s proposal is a revolutionary development.
The legal profession has taken sides—it is willing to reject the wellestablished legal protection of religious practice to the claims of sexual
equality rights.
That change would see the subservience of religion—beliefs and
practices—to the current iteration of sexual equality. Nova Scotia
Supreme Court Justice James Campbell declared, “[t]he Charter is
not a blueprint for moral conformity. Its purpose is to protect the
citizen from the power of the state, not to enforce compliance by
citizens or private institutions with the moral judgments of the
state.” 227 However, for many in the legal profession, using the Charter
as a blueprint for moral conformity is an attractive prospect.

223. Trinity W. Univ. v. B.C. Coll. of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, para.
25 (Can.).
224. Id. at para. 33.
225. Id.
226. In a telling article, law professors Carissima Mathen and Michael Plaxton, addressed
the academic arguments against TWU, namely there is more to law schools than the “blackletter law,” and that legal education ought to encourage students to examine their own religious
and moral commitments from a critical distance. Carissima Mathen & Michael Plaxton, Legal
Education, TWU and the Looking Glass, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND COMMUNITIES 229
(Dwight Newman ed., 2016). Their conclusion was, “We argue that many of the criticisms
directed at TWU’s proposed law school would apply, in some measure, to many or all of its
secular counterparts, and that it is inappropriate for critics to hole TWU to a standard to which
they are unwilling to hold themselves.” Id. at 224. They also noted, “one can simultaneously
hold a set of religious convictions and engage in meaningful critical thought and debate about
legal obligations that are in apparent tension with them.” Id. at 241.
227. Trinity W. Univ. v. N.S. Barristers’ Soc’y, 2015 NSSC 25, para. 10 (Can.).
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b. Eureka moment. As noted above, the “Eureka Moment” in a
scientific revolution occurs when a member or members of the
community “connects the dots” between the various anomalies and
the realization that the paradigm no longer explains what they saw.
They were convinced that a new paradigm was required to replace
the old.
Likewise, in the debate over the place of religious accommodation
and sexual equality, as exemplified in the two TWU cases (BCCT 2001
and the current law school case), a number of jurists have concluded
that the current paradigm accommodating religion is not appropriate
in a society that recognizes sexual equality. These jurists argue that by
trying to accommodate religion and at the same time recognize sexual
equality, the Supreme Court has tried to “square the circle.” 228 The
challenges of trying to affirm sexual equality while respecting religious
pluralism, but without passing judgment on the religious norms of
sexuality, have come to a head. In the same way racism is rejected as
wrong, both publicly and privately, so too must the traditional
religious view of marriage as only between one man and one woman
must not be tolerated publicly or privately. The greater community
“must through democratic means choose or prefer some values or
principles over others.” 229
Allowing marriage for same-sex couples is a sign of the
movement’s progress from “formal equality” to “real equality.” 230
Marriage is symbolic, but it is more than that. Marriage “is the
institution that accords to a union the profound social stamp of
approval and acceptance of the relationship as being of the highest
value.” 231 It has “priceless social respect, cachet and honour. It is the
signifier of societal approval for a relationship. . . . It is society’s way
of celebrating—not just recognising—the union of two people.” 232 It
is the recognition that those people are valuable 233 and society must,
therefore, celebrate them. For the LGBTQ community that means
society “not only accepts or condones [them], but approves

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
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MacDougall, supra note 209, at 237.
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Id. at 252 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 253.
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[them].” 234 Further, “[s]topping short denotes inferiority; it indicates
that there is thought to be something problematic with the group and
its members.” 235
Therefore, when a religious institution carrying on what is
considered a “public” service, i.e. a university, does not celebrate samesex marriage, the LGBTQ community interprets this stance or lack of
assent as society degrading them and treating them as inferior. In other
words, the opposition to TWU sees the “marriage issue” as settled and
that TWU needs to become progressive in its view. TWU, from this
perspective, cannot act upon its religious beliefs, because those beliefs
are not only unacceptable, but also morally wrong.
c. Consolidation. Kuhn noted that scientific revolutions often take
time to consolidate or become accepted in the scientific community.236
“[T]he transition between competing paradigms cannot be made a
step at a time, forced by logic and neutral experience.” 237 The “transfer
of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm,” says Kuhn, “is a conversion
experience that cannot be forced.” 238 It is not a matter of proof or
error. According to Kuhn:
[A] generation is sometimes required to effect the change, scientific
communities have again and again been converted to new
paradigms. Furthermore, these conversions occur not despite the
fact that scientists are human but because they are. Though some
scientists, particularly the older and more experienced ones, may
resist indefinitely, most of them can be reached in one way or
another. Conversions will occur a few at a time until, after the last
234. Id. at 256 (emphasis in original).
235. Id. at 257.
236. For example, “Copernicanism made few converts for almost a century after
Copernicus’ death. Newton’s work was not generally accepted, particularly on the Continent,
for more than half a century after the Principia appeared.” KUHN, supra note 97, at 150–51.
Professor Iain Benson has written of the implications of both “paradigm shifts” and “hidden”
or “"implicit” uses of language in the area of law and religion in relation to the work on the
nature of paradigms and language of Thomas Kuhn, Owen Barfield and Michael Polanyi. See
Iain T. Benson, An Associational Framework for the Reconciliation of Competing Rights Claims
Involving the Freedom of Religion, at 3–5 (Sept. 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of
the Witwatersrand), and his earlier work for the Canadian Government’s “Religion and Public
Policy Project,” Iain T. Benson, Taking a Fresh Look at Religion and Public Policy in Canada:
the
Need
for
a
Paradigm
Shift,
(2008),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1654422 (last visited November 15, 2016).
237. KUHN, supra note 97, at 150.
238. Id. at 151.
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holdouts have died, the whole profession will again be practicing
under a single, but now a different, paradigm.” 239

A similar pattern could be expected in the legal community.
However, the legal community is different due to its hierarchical
structure, with the SCC being the final arbiter of any legal debate.
Therefore, a legal revolution can be had quickly if the SCC agrees.
The SCC could say that religious accommodation must now give way
to the sexual equality claims. However, given the current
jurisprudence, even if the SCC agreed with the brewing legal
revolution taking place on this matter, the debate will not be
extinguished indefinitely. In the same way that the SCC’s 2001 TWU
decision did not end the debate within the legal profession, there is
no guarantee that the SCC’s decision on the TWU law school will end
the debate in the long term. The inability to end debate on such
contentious matters is the result of a number of factors.
First, the very nature of a democracy is such that debates continue.
Freedom of speech, no matter how much it is muffled in a given time
period or on a particular subject, will resurrect at some point. Second,
religious beliefs and practices last a long time. Christianity, for
example, has existed for over 2,000 years. It is highly unlikely,
therefore, that the traditional belief and practice on marriage will end
with a court order. Of course, the SCC probably would not ever
outlaw traditional marriage, but should it rule that marriage must not
be practiced on TWU’s campus as it currently exists with all students
required to sign the Community Covenant, then the SCC effectively
determines how religious groups can practice marriage within
religious communities. Third, recent SCC jurisprudence suggests that
its own previous decisions may be overruled in subsequent decisions,
given the right circumstances. This occurred most recently in the
Supreme Court of Canada’s Carter 240 decision granting the right to
physician assisted dying that over ruled an earlier decision.
The SCC’s Bedford 241 decision ruled that a trial court can
reconsider a previous SCC Charter case if: (a) the new case constitutes
a new legal issue “raised as a consequence of significant developments
in the law,” or (b) “there is a change in the circumstances or evidence
239. Id. at 152.
240. Carter v. Canada, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 (Can.).
241. Canada v. Bedford, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101 (Can.).
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that fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate.” 242 The Carter
decision legalized physician-assisted suicide when it overruled the
SCC’s 1993 Rodriguez 243 decision. The SCC held that stare decisis is
not a straitjacket that condemns the law to stasis. 244
The ability to revisit earlier cases means, regardless of the SCC’s
willingness to do so, that constitutional debates will continue for
generations. The SCC could accept the reasoning of the Ontario
courts and rule that its 2001 TWU decision is distinguishable from
the current case because in 2001 the SCC did not deal directly with
the issue of TWU’s requirement that students sign the “Community
Standards,” (as the Covenant was then known), but dealt solely with
the issue of whether TWU graduates would discriminate against
LGBTQ students in the public schools. However, the current case
deals with the requirement that students sign the Community
Covenant and be bound by it during their time as TWU students.
Therefore, the TWU law school case is addressing a different legal
issue, even though the facts are substantially similar. Further, the SCC
could agree with the argument that circumstances have substantially
changed because of the advance of equality rights since 2001. Social
acceptance of LGBTQ rights has increased within the legal
community, and equality rights have advanced. The SCC has shown a
willingness to reject the presumption of religion’s accommodation, as
evidenced in Hutterian Brethren 245 where, despite twenty-nine years
of the Province of Alberta accommodating the Hutterite religious
belief that their picture not be taken for a driver’s license, the SCC
ruled that the change in government policy no longer required the
religious accommodation. 246
In the current TWU case, the losing side can be consoled by the
fact that there is ample precedent that the fight could continue
another day with a new case that has facts that meet the Bedford test.
It may take time—perhaps a generation—for such a new case to
materialize, but the possibility could give hope. Legal revolutions may
come to be more common than previously thought.

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at para. 42.
Rodriguez v. Canada, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.).
Bedford, 3 S.C.R. at para. 44.
Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (Can.).
Id. at para. 71.
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6. Ramifications of the revolution on religion
a. The immediate effects on TWU. A SCC ruling against TWU’s
law school proposal would be a loss to an institution that has done
nothing out of the ordinary but follow historic Christian teachings on
human sexuality. TWU had been working on its law school proposal
for five years. 247 Its vigorous effort to create a law school promised to
make a significant contribution to the legal profession because its
graduates were going to be “practice ready.” 248 Unlike other law
schools that do not give their students much practical legal experience,
TWU’s proposal would dramatically alter the current approach to
legal education in Canada. The loss of TWU’s program would be a
loss not only to the university, but to the legal profession.
A ruling against the proposal may also mean that TWU would
have to face yet another attack on its education degree. The 2001 case
involved the BCCT’s refusal of TWU’s degree accreditation because
of its concern about requiring students to sign the Community
Standards. 249 The loss of the TWU law school proposal would
encourage the BCCT to resurrect its opposition to TWU’s degree,
using the same approach as the legal profession.
Other professional programs at TWU, such as nursing and
accounting, may suffer a similar fate as the law school proposal. The
nursing and accounting programs would come under similar pressure
to refuse recognition of TWU graduates. Though TWU graduates
perform well in those respective professions, it would not matter.
Accepting graduates from a program that is deemed to have
discriminatory beliefs and practices on marriage—between one man

247. Janet Epp Buckingham, What’s all the fuss about Trinity Western University?, CARDUS
DAILY (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.cardus.ca/blog/2014/02/whats-all-the-fuss-abouttrinity-western-university.
248. Janet Epp-Buckingham described this in her interview with CBC Radio program
“The Current” in a show entitled, “Would a law school at a private Christian University
discriminate against gays and lesbians?” on March 28, 2013 (online at
http://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/mar-28-2013-1.2910164/would-a-faith-based-lawschool-be-discriminatory-1.2910166):
What we are wanting to focus on is to graduate practise ready lawyers like a medical
school that produces ready to work doctors. But right now the law schools across
Canada have a more theoretical focus and they count on the articling year for law
students to learn the actual practise skills. What we want to do here is to create a law
school based on Christian values that’s like a super high quality medical school.
249. Trinity W. Univ. v. B.C. Coll. of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, paras.
3–4 (Can.).
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and one woman—would be considered politically incorrect for these
professional organizations.
b. The immediate effects on liberal democracy.
(1) The uniqueness of the TWU law school case. Should the SCC
rule against the TWU law school, the law will have crossed the
Rubicon. It will no longer be neutral on the matters of religious belief,
but will have accepted the view that a religious community can no
longer operate its own institutions with the belief that marriage is
between one man and one woman. That reality will make freedom to
practice religious beliefs very difficult in Canada.
To suggest that religious freedom would be endangered by the
loss of TWU’s law school case may appear to be melodramatic and
unwarranted given the long historical legal deference toward religion
in Canada. It certainly would challenge the SCC’s self-analysis that
“[t]he protection of freedom of religion afforded by s. 2 (a) of the
Charter is broad and jealously guarded in our Charter
jurisprudence.” 250 However, the TWU law school case is like no other
religious freedom case in the history of Canadian jurisprudence for the
following reasons.
(a) Debate of public/private sphere. There has been a
massive pushback on the propriety of religious belief and practice
concerning human sexuality. The TWU law school case has now
become the epicenter of the competition between religion and sexual
orientation. The claim is that religious communities have no right to
maintain their own distinctive nature when operating in “public.”251
The premise of the argument is that religion, religious individuals, and
religious communities have no business bringing their religious beliefs
and practices into the so-called public sphere. Religion should only be
confined to “the context of actual religious worship and
observance.” 252 Otherwise, any person could, on the basis of genuinely
held belief, “demand an exemption from non-discrimination norms in
the provision of services to the public.” 253 If religious communities are

250.
251.
252.
253.

Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, para. 53 (Can.).
MacDougall & Short, supra note 132, at 138.
Id. at 134.
Id.
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involved in “public” enterprises, they must either yield to public
norms or vacate the public field.
This argument requires a definition of “public” that describes the
provision of services and endeavors outside of “actual religious
worship and observance.” 254 Thus, religion is limited to a very narrow
definition of the “private sphere,” but the “public sphere” is much
broader, “where the rights of others ought not to be affected by
religious beliefs.” 255 In essence, this argument demands that religion
be confined to the four walls of a church, mosque, or temple. Any
involvement of religion outside of the church is to be curtailed. This
was the approach taken by the Ontario courts in their rulings against
TWU. For example, the Divisional Court held that TWU can exercise
its religious freedom “without acting in a manner that coerces others
into forsaking their true beliefs in order to have an equal opportunity
to a legal education. It is at that point that the right to freedom of
religion must yield.” 256
Another way to view this problem was described by Professor
Víctor M. Muñiz-Fraticelli who applied Nathan Oman’s two theories
of the market for anti-discrimination to the TWU case. 257 The public
theory of the market analogizes the power relationship between the
state and citizen to that of the market. 258 It argues that the private
relationships in the market (being a public space) ought to be
congruent with the state-citizen relationship that is found in a “well
functioning liberal democracy.” 259 This creates a serious problem for
religious organizations, like TWU, that engage in public endeavors
within a religious context that does not accept public sexual norms
and values. The mere fact of incongruence is problematic according
to the public theory.
Thus, the TWU law school runs afoul because of the community
covenant’s discrimination of the LGBT community. As Muñiz-

254.
255.
256.
257.

Id.
Id. at 138.
Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2015] 126 O.R. 3d 1, para. 117 (Can.).
Víctor M. Muñiz-Fraticelli, The (Im)possibility of Christian Education, in RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND COMMUNITIES, supra note 226, at 209, 217 (citing Nathan Oman, Doux
Commerce, Religion, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 92 IND. L.J. at 14 (forthcoming
2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2748585).
258. Id. at 217.
259. Oman, supra note 257, at 16.
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Fraticelli points out, “Error—as the old Papal adage went—has no
rights.” 260 Since TWU is not congruent with the policies of the law
societies it forfeits accreditation. Otherwise, if accreditation were
given despite the incongruence the law societies, under this view,
would be “complicit” with TWU’s accreditation. 261 “But if every
accrediting decision implies complicity with the values of the program
that is licensed,” noted Muñiz-Fraticelli, “then there is no possibility
for diversity of values in any field that requires state approval.” 262 It
would lead to a bizarre situation where religious education could not
be different than public schools running on public values. Why permit
religious schools at all? 263 I might add, it defies the whole
constitutional protection of religion. The second theory is the private
theory of the market. This theory is concerned with systemic
discrimination that would prevent victims from participating in
commerce. 264 TWU would be afoul if its policy were part of the
systemic denial of the LGBT community to legal education. However,
“this is patently not the case,” Muñiz-Fraticelli argues. 265 TWU has
publicly embraced the value of ensuring all are eligible to attend its
law school including those of the LGBTQ community with the
proviso they follow the Community Covenant. There is also broad
support of the LGBTQ community in the law schools and the
legal profession.

260. Muñiz-Fraticelli, supra note 257, at 220.
261. Id. This is the same view of the Ontario courts. The Divisional Court, in Trinity W.
Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2015] 126 O.R. 3d 1 (Can.), recognized that TWU had the
religious freedom right to operate its school, “[t]hat right does not carry with it, however, a
concomitant right in TWU to compel [the Law Society of Upper Canada] to accredit it, and this
lend its tacit approval to the institutional discrimination that is inherent in the manner in which
TWU is choosing to operate its law school. To reach a conclusion by which TWU would compel
the respondent, directly or indirectly, to adopt the world view that TWU espouses would not
represent a balancing of the competing Charter rights. Rather, such a conclusion would reflect
a result where the applicants’ rights to freedom of religion would have been given unrestricted
sway.” Id. at para. 115.
262. Muñiz-Fraticelli, supra note 257, at 220. Indeed the Ontario Court of Appeal saw
TWU as an exception from all the other law schools and that fact the LSUC could use as part of
its reasons for denying TWU accreditation. Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 2016
ONCA 518, para. 132, 134 (Can.).
263. Muñiz-Fraticelli, supra note 257, at 220.
264. Id. at 218.
265. Id. at 219.
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The private theory of the market gives space to religious
communities to engage in public endeavors provided they are not
denying access to public goods and services. 266
The lines of reasoning of the public theory of the market, and the
idea that religious communities cannot operate in the public sphere is
problematic for more reasons than those suggested by MuñizFraticelli. First, it ignores the historical reality of religious involvement
in the so-called public sphere. For millennia, the Christian community
has operated a number of “public” enterprises, such as hospitals267 and
universities. In fact, Christians have operated universities since the
sixth century, 268 and though secular law schools may not acknowledge
it, they are, to a large extent, “beneficiaries of a Christian heritage.”269
Second, while the historical fact of religious institutions in the
“public sphere” does not necessarily require that it must always be so,
it nevertheless suggests that the role of religion in the public sphere
has been significant and demands respect rather than being treated as
irrelevant. Religion has always played an important role in establishing
public institutions in the form of religious schools from elementary to
graduate school, which is not new, irrelevant, or illegitimate, but is
part of what has made Western civilization the envy of the world.
Third, as noted above, in 2001 the SCC viewed TWU as a “private
institution.” 270 However, the animus toward TWU has meant that
there has been a concerted effort to redefine the meaning of “private
institution” to encompass only those who stay cloistered in their
religious houses of worship. The SCC in 2001 271 and the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court in 2015 272 held to the traditional understanding of
“private institution” as being what TWU is—a post-secondary

266. Id. at 221.
267. Timothy S. Miller, From Poorhouse to Hospital: How the Christian Hospital Evolved
from a House of Charity that Cared for the Poor to the Medical Institution We Know Today,
CHRISTIAN HISTORY, no. 101, 2011, at 16.
268. See PIERRE RICHÉ, EDUCATION AND CULTURE IN THE BARBARIAN WEST (1978).
269. HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND
RELIGION 351 (2000 ed.). Also note that Elmer John Thiessen, in his work, IN DEFENCE OF
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES (2001), details the many Canadian universities that
started as Christian universities including Acadia, McMaster, McGill, and the University
of Ottawa.
270. Trinity W. Univ. v. B.C. Coll. of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, para.
1 (Can.).
271. Id.
272. Trinity W. Univ. v. N.S. Barristers’ Soc’y, 2015 NSSC 25 (Can.).
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institution run by a religious community. To suggest that TWU loses
its status as a private institution because it must receive government
accreditation of its degrees is disingenuous.
Fourth, in reality the argument that religion has no public space is
an attempt to re-imagine religion as a destructive force rather than a
positive force that has contributed to the well-being of liberal
democratic societies. This tactic appears to be necessary because it is
the religious-based claims for exemption from modern sexual norms
that have disturbed those who expect no contrary position. To
eliminate all opposition to modern sexual equality norms requires a
concerted effort to destroy the legitimacy of religion and religious
institutions in the public eye. Fifth, this argument dismisses even a
semblance of diversity by demanding that even within the selfdescribed “private sphere,” only the public norm must prevail. The
argument suggests that if a religious institution is “more centrally
involved in instilling the tenets of the faith” there would be some
room for it to operate while discriminating against those whose sexual
norms are not in keeping with the religious institution’s faith, but
“perhaps only in the specific contexts where those tenets are actually
being instilled.” 273 Therefore, for example, this argument would not
allow a church to ensure that its janitor accepts and follows its
teachings on human sexuality. If not the janitor, then perhaps the
church would not be allowed to discriminate against those whom it
allows to collect church offering week to week. It is an argument that
is intolerant of difference and is using law “as the means of forcing
one set of beliefs to be dominant.” 274
Sixth, the argument states that it is alarmist to suggest that
accepting sexual orientation equality claims is bound to result in
interference with religious worship on the issue of marriage. 275 If it is
improper to be involved in a public enterprise and follow one’s
religious convictions on human sexuality, then should it not follow
that it is improper for clergy, performing a public function of marrying
people, to refuse to perform a marriage based on religious scruples?
In other words, a loss for TWU directly challenges the SCC’s holding
273. MacDougall & Short, supra note 132, at 140.
274. Iain T. Benson, The Attack on Western Religions by Western Law: Re-Framing
Pluralism, Liberalism and Diversity, (Sept. 20, 2013), at 113, http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2328825.
275. MacDougall & Short, supra note 132, at 145–46.
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in the Marriage Reference that clergy are protected from having to
perform their public function of marrying people if it interferes with
their religious beliefs. 276 I suggest that the refusal to allow marriage
commissioners in Saskatchewan 277 an exemption from performing
marriages that they are morally opposed to is not much different in
principle than the ministers of religion or clergy who were given that
right in the Same-sex Marriage Reference. Both the clergy and
marriage commissioners are acting as public officials. Both are refusing
to perform on the basis of religious grounds. The only difference is
one is employed by the church and the other by the state. If, as
Professor Richard Moon suggests, “freedom of religion does not
support the accommodation of religious views about the rights and
freedoms of others,” 278 then there is a dissonance between how the
law treats clergy and marriage commissioners. 279
(b) Res judicata. The TWU case is the only case in which
the exact same litigant is facing a later identical challenge to its
religious freedom. In 2001, the SCC decided that TWU’s religious
freedom was unjustifiably infringed when the BCCT denied
accreditation to its educational program. 280 The BCCT denial was not
because of the lack of academic rigor of TWU. As noted above, the
competency of TWU graduates to teach was not an issue. The issue
was whether they would discriminate against LGBTQ students. The

276. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, para. 58. (Can.).
277. Three cases in Saskatchewan have ruled that marriage commissioners opposed to
performing same-sex weddings cannot be accommodated. They are: Nichols v. Dept. of Justice,
(25 October 2006, Sask. HRT); Nichols v. M.J., 2009 SKQB 299 (Can.); Re Marriage
Commissioners Appointed Under The Marriage Act, 2011 SKCA 3 (Can.).
278. Richard Moon, Conscientious Objections by Civil Servants: The Case of Marriage
Commissioners and Same-Sex Civil Marriages, in BENJAMIN L. BERGER AND RICHARD MOON,
RELIGION AND THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 165 (2016).
279. Professor Moon suggests the difference is that marriage commissioners are state actors
and their opposition cannot be protected as religious freedom under s. 2(a) of the Charter
because their opposition is really not about religion but a political position about the rights of
others in the public sphere. See id. at 163. I take Professor Moon’s position to be that once a
person, like a marriage commissioner, takes a public role then personal conscience can no longer
be protected under the Charter. While I do not have the space to adequately rebut that position
it appears to suggest that those with religious conscientious positions against public norms need
not apply to public offices. That, in my respectful view, cannot be positive for the long term
health of a democratic society especially when there are ample ways to accommodate public
officials without having to cause any substantive harm to anyone’s sexual equality rights.
280. Trinity W. Univ. v. B.C. Coll. of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 (Can.).
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BCCT alleged that these graduates would discriminate against
LGBTQ students in the BC schools. There was no evidence to support
the allegation. In fact, no TWU graduate has ever been accused of
committing such an act of discrimination. That lack of occurrence is
telling. At best, such a fear of how TWU graduates might act was
irrational; at worst, it was a direct act of discrimination by the BCCT
against TWU because the BCCT did not approve of TWU’s religious
worldview on human sexuality. 281
From an objective, rational basis, the similarities between TWU
2001 and TWU Law School Case are striking. The similarities may be
visualized as follows:
2001 BCCT Case
1. TWU Degree
Accreditation—Education
Degree
2. Professional Administrative
Decision of Government
Actor—BCCT
3. Accusation—potential
discrimination against
homosexuals by TWU students
anticipated
4. Instrument—Community
Standards

TWU Law School Case
1. TWU Degree
Accreditation—Law Degree
2. Professional Administrative
Decision of Government
Actors—BC Law Society; Law
Society of Upper Canada; Nova
Scotia Barristers’ Society
3. Accusation—Discrimination
against LGBTQ by TWU—
students deemed competent
and will not be discriminatory
4. Instrument—Community
Covenant

Given these similarities, it seemed implausible that TWU would,
yet again, have to fight for its right to have accreditation for a new
degree, especially considering that the government actors admitted
that TWU graduates would be fully qualified to enter into the

281. In its fall 1996 quarterly newsletter the BCCT stated:
Both the Canadian Human Rights Act and the B.C. Human Rights Act prohibit
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. The Charter of Rights and the
Human Rights Acts express the values which represent the public interest. Labelling
homosexual behaviour as sinful has the effect of excluding persons whose sexual
orientation is gay or lesbian. The Council believes and is supported by law in the belief
that sexual orientation is no more separable from a person than colour. Persons of
homosexual orientation, like persons of colour, are entitled to protection and freedom
from discrimination under the law. See Coll. of Teachers, 1 S.C.R. at para. 6.
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profession but for the admissions requirement. This requirement,
incidentally, has absolutely no bearing on the academic qualifications
of TWU graduates. I am aware of no precedent for such treatment by
any other institution of higher learning in the history of Canada.
Further, I have not seen, in any of my research, any other institution
in the Western world having to face twice a very similar legal challenge
at the highest court of the land. It is reasonable to conclude that TWU
is being punished because the legal community finds TWU’s religious
belief and practice of marriage repugnant.
(2) The loss of religious freedom. A religious belief is nothing
without the opportunity to practice that belief. Religious
communities, such as TWU, and their constituent members do not
hold religious views lightly. Such beliefs are their very identity. A
ruling that effectively bans them from operating their university in
accordance with their religious belief on marriage is not simply
rebuking the belief but also the institution and the individuals. The
religious community would no longer be truly free.
To deny TWU accreditation of its proposed law school is to deny
the right of religious communities to establish their own institutions
based on their religious beliefs. To suggest, as did the Ontario
Divisional Court, that if TWU does not open its law school because
the Law Society does not accredit it is “more an economic decision,
as opposed to a religious one” 282 turns the logic of the Charter on its
head. While denying TWU graduates access to the largest legal market
in the country will create a serious financial impediment to TWU’s law
school, that financial circumstance is the direct result of the Law
Society’s denial of TWU’s religious freedom rights.
It is true that exercising one’s religious freedom may have a cost.
However, when that cost stems from a government actor’s disapproval
of a religious belief that is not against public policy or illegal, that cost
is unjust. It is not against public policy for TWU to operate its school
based on the traditional definition of marriage. 283 The Law Society
simply does not agree with TWU’s definition and practice of marriage.

282. Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2015] 126 O.R. 3d 1, para. 85 (Can.).
283. Consider the Preamble of the Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c 33, (Can.), which
states in part, “WHEREAS it is not against the public interest to hold and publicly express diverse
views on marriage.”
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The Law Society’s attempt to enforce its moral view denies TWU
graduates “full participation in society.” 284
Nova Scotia Justice Jamie S. Campbell understood this when he
ruled: “[TWU’s Community Covenant] is not unlawful. It may be
offensive to many but it is not unlawful. TWU is not the government.
Like churches and other private institutions it does not have to comply
with the equality provisions of the Charter.” 285 He noted that TWU
has not breached any applicable human rights legislation. While its
policies are not consistent with the preferred moral values of the Nova
Scotia Barristers’ Society Council, “[t]he Charter is not a blueprint
for moral conformity. Its purpose is to protect the citizen from the
power of the state, not to enforce compliance by citizens or private
institutions with the moral judgments of the state.” 286
The Divisional Court’s reasoning appears to be willing to make
the Charter the blueprint for moral conformity. Yet, as we saw in
2001, the SCC ruled that TWU could not be forced to accept the
public norm on human sexuality when it stated that “[t]he diversity
of Canadian society is partly reflected in the multiple religious
organizations that mark the societal landscape and this diversity of
views should be respected.” 287
The Divisional Court’s decision is also reminiscent of the SCC’s
now-overturned 1963 decision that upheld The Lord’s Day Act,
holding that the inability to open a business on Sunday did not
interfere with religious freedom but only interfered with “a purely
secular and financial” concern. 288 In its 1985 Big M decision, the SCC
ruled that “[i]f a person is compelled by the state or the will of another
to a course of action or inaction which he would not otherwise have
chosen, he is not acting of his own volition and he cannot be said to
be truly free.” 289 State compulsion in matters of conscience has
historically been shown to be detrimental to a democratic state. It is a
principle that the SCC understood in Big M.
The Divisional Court also stated that TWU has the right to create
its own law school and exercise its religious freedom, but it does not
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Coll. of Teachers, 1 S.C.R. at para. 35.
Trinity W. Univ. v. N.S. Barristers’ Soc’y, [2015] NSSC 25, para. 10 (Can.).
Id.
Coll. of Teachers, 1 S.C.R. at para. 33.
Robertson & Rosetanni v. R., [1963] S.C.R. 651, 658 (Can.).
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, para. 95 (Can.).
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have the right to “compel” the Law Society to accredit it, thereby
lending the Law Society’s “tacit approval to the institutional
discrimination that is inherent in the manner in which TWU is
choosing to operate its law school.” 290 It would amount to “directly
or indirectly” forcing the Law Society “to adopt the world view that
TWU espouses.” 291 That result “would not represent a balancing of
the competing Charter rights,” but would allow TWU’s freedom of
religion to have “unrestricted sway.” 292
The Divisional Court did not appreciate the reality that religious
freedom provides religious adherents the space to practice their faith.
The Law Society is no more adopting the worldview of TWU by
accrediting its law school than is the licensing authority of motor
vehicles adopting the worldview of those drivers who receive their
driver’s licenses. The Law Society’s function is to ensure that TWU
graduates are competently educated to practice law and then grant
licenses accordingly, in the same way that the motor vehicle authority
is to ensure the driver is competent to get behind the wheel of a vehicle
and travel the highway. However, with the Divisional Court’s
decision, does the Law Society now see itself as having the
responsibility to inquire into the beliefs and practices of prospective
lawyers before granting them licenses to practice law?
The Divisional Court’s logic appears to suggest that all
government agencies would have to ensure that they agree with the
worldviews of those receiving state permission (or privileges) in
whatever form, such as: licenses, grants of money, building permits,
accreditation of schools (elementary, secondary, and post-secondary),
and special exemptions. In that case, the state would become the
Grand Inquisitor to ensure that all citizens have the correct opinion.
If the Divisional Court’s reasoning is upheld, then there will be no
practical religious freedom in Canada. It would, in short, be the end
of our free and democratic society.
(3) State supremacy over individual conscience. The loss of an
individual’s ability to follow his or her conscience is the point at which
the state becomes the sole sovereign. As noted above, throughout
Western civilization there has been tension between the state claiming
the sole allegiance of its subjects and the claim of individual conscience
290. Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2015] 126 O.R. 3d 1, para. 115.
291. Id.
292. Id.
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to follow his or her duty to divine sovereignty. The above discussion
on the Reformation also showed that the bifurcation of sovereignty
allowed for religious freedom as we know it today. Further, religious
freedom was the prototypical right in modern states that blazed the
trail for other basic human rights such as freedom of speech, assembly,
and association. The reduction of religious freedom by the rise of state
supremacy over the individual conscience is, if history is any
indication, a troubling development.
State supremacy over individual conscience presupposes that the
state has the power to force the will of society on the individual. The
discretion to grant TWU accreditation is a solemn responsibility. To
make granting accreditation subject to whether TWU’s moral views
harmonize with those of the state is unjust. The protection of religion
in liberal democracies mitigated the brute forces that would deny
freedom of speech, the press, association, assembly, conscience, and
mobility, not to mention the right of fair trial.
The individual, and by extension fellow believers in a religious
community, will either be denied the right to follow his or her
conscience or be punished by the state for paying homage to divinity
as he or she feels is their responsibility. The state would then be
determining who will be sovereign in an individual’s life. This
approach takes on the characteristics of those ancient Roman
emperors who demanded allegiance as both God and king to
their citizens.
(4) Suppression of religious charities.
(a) Religious charities will close. Other Christian
universities across the country with similar stands to TWU regarding
marriage can be expected to either fall in line with the new political
and legal reality of sexual equality rights or face similar retribution for
being “on the wrong side of history.” Our legal system will undertake
a systematic recalibration as religion’s protection and special status is
removed from the law.
The loss of religious freedom for private religious institutions such
as TWU to maintain their distinct religious beliefs and practice as they
continue to operate will inevitably lead many, if not most, of those
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institutions to close their doors. 293 It is the religious character of these
institutions that establishes the very root of who and what they are as
“a living faith tradition.” 294 TWU’s claim to operate with its
Community Covenant “is a claim simply to live out the educational
dimension of that Christian community’s life,” as Dwight Newman so
aptly put it. He continues, “The TWU claim is not a claim to
isolationism but a claim to manifest religious belief in community, well
within the core of religious freedom.” 295 If the religious organization
cannot be what it was set up to be, it will not exist. A religious
community will not permit its time, money, and effort to go toward a
project that is not in keeping with the community’s strongly held
views. It has no interest in its institution being like the
public institutions.
An example of a Christian humanitarian agency closing because of
the state’s failure to provide for its religious freedom occurred in
Massachusetts. Massachusetts law did not allow the Roman Catholic
child adoption agency to take its religious view into account when
arranging adoptions; the agency felt it had no choice but to close.296
To do otherwise would have violated its strongly held religious belief
about human sexuality and the importance of children being raised
with both a mother and a father. Unfortunately, not even the fact that
the Catholic adoption agency provided the lion’s share of specialneeds children with adoptive homes was enough to convince the state
of Massachusetts to accommodate the agency’s religious views. 297 The
equality argument was such a potent force that it demanded full
compliance with no opportunity for compromise. “Massachusetts has
essentially made a qualitative judgment on religious views opposing
homosexuality in finding them untenable in the arena of

293. “Given how fundamental the biblical conception of marriage is to TWU’s identity,
the alternative to TWU Law School with the discriminatory CCA [Community Covenant
Agreement] is not TWU Law School without the CCA. The alternative is no TWU Law School
at all, and thus no additional places for straight or LGBTQ, religious or secular students.”
Muñiz-Fraticelli, supra note 257, at 219.
294. Dwight Newman, Ties That Bind: Religious Freedom and Communities, in RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND COMMUNITIES, supra note 226, at 18.
295. Id.
296. Matthew W. Clark, The Gospel According to the State: An Analysis of Massachusetts
Adoption Laws and the Closing of Catholic Charities Adoption Services, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
871, 873, 895 (2008).
297. Id. at 896
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adoptions.” 298 Massachusetts sacrificed “one value judgment, the right
of homosexuals to adopt, for another, the role of religion in
determining a child’s best interests.” 299 Offended feelings over sexual
identity took precedence over the very practical reality of specialneeds children.
The Ontario Court of Appeal was similarly willing to remove
TWU’s right to operate its law school because its Community
Covenant “hurts.” 300 It mattered not to the Court of Appeal that
TWU was willing to allow for the full range of diversity, including all
sexual identities, to attend as long as they were willing to abide by the
Covenant. Offended feelings over sexual identity again took
precedence over the religious freedom right to run a Christian law
school. These are among the practical realities of the legal revolution
currently under way. However, it is a revolution that will, in all
probability, meet strong resistance. In fact, the level of engagement of
a wide array of Christian groups supporting TWU is evidence of that
proposition. Religious communities are tenacious in maintaining their
religious purposes and identities. 301 In the West, 2,000 years of history
testify to that reality. Refusing religious communities the right to
maintain their religious identities in their own private humanitarian
institutions is unjust. It will have a negative effect on the greater good
of our democratic society when religious charities are forced to close
as a result.
Religious groups have been at the heart of equality rights in the
West for centuries, from the William Wilberforce’s anti-slavery
movement to the modern struggle for equality of immigrants from
Syria to Canada. Christian groups have raised their voices for redress
for hundreds of years. When political expediency during WWII
demanded Canadian citizens of Japanese ancestry to be incarcerated
and then later to be deported the religious communities rose up in
fierce opposition to such “false, cruel, un-British and above all, un-

298. Id. at 895.
299. Id.
300. Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 2016 ONCA 518 para. 119 (Can.)
(“My conclusion is a simple one: the part of TWU’s Community Covenant in issue in this appeal
is deeply discriminatory to the LGBTQ community, and it hurts.”).
301. Consider that even today with the rise of the “nones” who prefer no religion, 66% of
Canadians identify as Christian. See Canada’s Changing Religious Landscape, PEW RES. CTR. (June
27, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/06/27/canadas-changing-religious-landscape/.
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Christian” 302 plans. As one clergy wrote, those “born in this country
are no more responsible for what the militarists of the country of their
racial origin have done . . .then are Canadian citizens of any other
racial background.” He demanded the politicians answer why
discriminate against Japanese Canadians but “not against Canadians
whose ancestry is German, Italian, Finnish, Hungarian, Romanian,
or Bulgarian?” 303
Scholars Michael Barnett and Janice Gross Stein observed, “it is
only a slight exaggeration to say ‘no religion, no humanitarianism.’”304
The number of religious-based entities in humanitarian work is on the
rise globally. 305 It is ironic that while the rest of the world benefits from
religious-based humanitarian charities, the West is being denied such
services because the legal revolution cannot accept religious agencies
operating within a structure that supports traditional sexual ethics.
The world and Western society benefit when such agencies are
permitted to carry out their work without state imposition of
sexual norms.
This is not to belittle the obvious pain that members of the
LGBTQ community have experienced within religious communities
as is evidenced by a number of LGBTQ advocates in the TWU Law
School case. 306 However, the point remains that religious
communities, despite all of their short comings, are contributors to
the social good and they are not to be diminished, denied equal
treatment, or maligned because they maintain traditional sexual norms
within their own communities even though they are engaged in what
is now perceived as “public” endeavors. As lawyer, and LGBTQ rights
advocate, Kevin Kindred, stated,

302. STEPHANIE BANGARTH, VOICES RAISED IN PROTEST: DEFENDING NORTH
AMERICAN CITIZENS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY, 1942-49, at 80 (2008).
303. Id.
304. SACRED AID: FAITH AND HUMANITARIANISM 4 (Michael Barnett & Janice Stein eds., 2012).
305. Andrea Paras & Janice Gross Stein, Bridging the Sacred and the Profane in
Humanitarian Life, in SACRED AID: FAITH AND HUMANITARIANISM, supra note 304, at 212.
306. See the evidence of Professor Elaine Craig before the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society,
February , 2014, wherein she stated, “In my first year of law school, I came out to my family.
My parents rejected me, disowned me, because of their belief that homosexuality is disgusting
and perverted, vile and shameful, you might say.” N.S. Barristers’ Soc’y, Meeting of the
Executive Committee of the Council, at 13 (Feb. 13, 2014), http://nsbs.
org/sites/default/files/ftp/TWU_Submissions/2014-02-13_NSBSTrinityWesternU.pdf.
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What troubles me the most when I try to come to terms with questions
like this [accreditation of TWU Law School] is the fear that sometimes
the arguments for equality for gays and lesbians are used as a sword and
are used in order to attack the valued place that religious dissenters and
religious minorities ought to occupy in Canadian culture. 307

Professor Andrew Koppelman notes, that those who are most
concerned with the growing inequality would be making a
“catastrophic error” in being hostile toward religion because of
religion’s historic role in such issues as slavery, the New Deal, civil
rights and protesting war. 308
(b) The removal of benefits and accommodations. As this
Article notes, religion has been accommodated in a myriad of ways in
Canadian law. The removal of religious freedom from its protected
status will lead to the removal of the law’s rebuttable presumption that
religion is to be accommodated. A hierarchical regime where equality
rights trump religion will mean that where there is a conflict, perhaps
even only a perceived conflict, between religion and equality, the result
will be the diminution of the perceived “religious privilege.”
(i) Clergy accommodation. The first religious areas to
go, therefore, will be those areas where religion conflicts with equality.
One cannot make an exhaustive list, but certainly the most obvious
would be the removal of the accommodation given to clergy who
cannot marry a couple because of religious scruples. In Marriage
Reference, the SCC stated:
[S]tate compulsion on religious officials to perform same-sex
marriages contrary to their religious beliefs would violate the
guarantee of freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter. It also
seems apparent that, absent exceptional circumstances which we
cannot at present foresee, such a violation could not be justified
under s. 1 of the Charter. 309

At first blush, this holding appears to be immovable. However, it
is immovable only in the current legal paradigm that treats religion as
special and worthy of constitutional protection. Once religion has
been determined to be the nemesis of equality, religion will be seen in
307. Id. at 150.
308. Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and The Purposes of
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 629 (2015).
309. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, para. 58 (Can.).
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a very different light. Should the SCC adopt the arguments being
advanced against TWU that were accepted by the Ontario Divisional
Court, religious scruples would no longer justify the refusal of clergy
conducting a public function, namely, the marriage of any two
persons. Allowing clergy to refuse would be fundamentally
inconsistent with the new paradigm, which does not see religion as
worthy of protection. In the new paradigm, the state act of granting
authority to clergy to perform a public action would be legitimizing
the religious beliefs underlying the clergy’s refusal to marry, similar to
the reasoning of the Saskatchewan court in refusing to respect the
right of conscience for civil marriage commissioners. 310 In the same
way, the Law Society would be condoning and accepting the
worldview of TWU by allowing TWU graduates to practice law in
its jurisdiction.
(ii) Charitable status for advancement of religion.
Throughout the current TWU litigation, 311 the law societies and/or
their allies have argued that the case of Bob Jones University 312 in the
United States is applicable because both it and the TWU case involved
forms of perceived discrimination. Bob Jones University (BJU) was
not allowed to maintain its charitable tax status because of its racist
policies based upon religious beliefs. 313 TWU’s requirement that
students sign a community covenant is seen as religious discrimination
against the LGBTQ community. Therefore, as the argument goes, just
as BJU was not permitted charitable status for its discriminatory
practice so too TWU law school should not receive accreditation
because both are equally discriminatory and neither is to be preferred
over the other—they are “on the same footing”. 314
The analogy of Bob Jones University’s racial policies to TWU’s
policy on traditional marriage is an analogy that simply does not apply.
First, the TWU case is not about charitable tax status, but about
accreditation. Loss of charitable status is a negative financial impact
but a minor impediment compared to the loss of accreditation. In any
310. Re Marriage Comm’rs Appointed Under The Marriage Act, 2011 SKCA 3, [2011]
S.J. No. 3 (Can.).
311. The Ontario Court of Appeal accepted the BJU analogy. Trinity W. Univ. v. Law Soc’y
of Upper Can., 2016 ONCA 518 paras. 136–38 (Can.).
312. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
313. Id. at 574.
314. Transcript of Oral Argument at 128, lines 1–6, Trinity W. Univ. v. N.S. Barristers’
Soc’y, [2015] NSSC 25, para. 230 (Can.) (No. 427,840).
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balancing of the public good and the burden imposed there can be
little doubt that TWU’s loss of accreditation would be far more
egregious than the loss of charitable status. Loss of charitable status
would make TWU more expensive but still able to run its program;
loss of accreditation eliminates TWU’s ability to provide the law
degree program because of the public regulation of the
legal profession.
Second, as pointed out by Professor Mary Ann Waldron, the
history of black students’ access to education in the U.S. is a very
different issue than the history of LGBTQ community’s access in
Canada. 315 While not diminishing the struggles the LGBTQ
community have had in Canada, Waldron noted, “no school and no
public policy have ever barred LGBTQ students from attending a
school or university.” 316 “[T]hose with differing sexual orientations or
genders are not under-represented in the well-educated or the
professional classes.” 317 Therefore there is no “remedial need for
punitive public policy to require all institutions to accept samesex marriage.” 318
Third, the IRS policy is an accurate reflection of US public policy
on the issue of racial relations. Racial discrimination has no public
good. However, in the case of TWU things are much different. The
Canadian government and the Supreme Court of Canada 319 recognize
the fact that reasonable people can have differing views on same-sex
marriage. In 2005 Parliament made it clear in the Civil Marriage
Act 320 that nothing in the Act that redefined marriage as being

315. Mary Anne Waldron, Analogy and Neutrality: Thinking about Freedom of Religion, in
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND COMMUNITIES, supra note 226, at 252.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, paras. 56–60 (Can.).
320. Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c 33 (Can.). The Preamble states in part:
WHEREAS everyone has the freedom of conscience and religion under section 2 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;
WHEREAS nothing in this Act affects the guarantee of freedom of conscience and
religion and, in particular, the freedom of members of religious groups to hold and
declare their religious beliefs and the freedom of officials of religious groups to refuse
to perform marriages that are not in accordance with their religious beliefs;
WHEREAS it is not against the public interest to hold and publicly express diverse
views on marriage;
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between “any two persons” affects the religious freedom guarantee of
members of religious groups to hold and declare their religious beliefs
on marriage. It further sets out in section 3.1 that it is not against the
public interest to hold and publicly express diverse views on
marriage. 321 Also of note is that the Income Tax Act322 was amended to
ensure that a registered charity with the stated purpose of advancing
religion would not be penalized and lose its charitable status because
it exercised its religious freedom in relation to marriage between
persons of the same sex. 323
Fourth, there is a corollary to the third point and that is “all
discriminatory acts are not the same and do not carry the same
consequences.” 324 As Professor Waldron explains, discrimination that
can be and ought to be remedied will not damage the institution.325
However, when there is discrimination for which the remedy will
destroy the very thing that is desired then that discrimination cannot
be culpable. 326
Applying this to TWU and BJU we see the following: the remedy
to address BJU’s policy was to refuse it charitable status. Further, I
suggest that the IRS policy was intentional. It was meant to encourage
institutions like BJU to end its bigoted racial policies, not destroy the
institution. Waldron suggests that that is acceptable because the
theological position of BJU “never had a substantial tradition in
Christianity, nor were they supported by any respectable
theologian.” 327 It is also the reality that the facts of racial superiority
have been disproved. 328 This reality, Waldron suggests, means that
BJU’s policy “does not legitimately fall within the category of

321. Civil Marriage Act, S.C. 2005, c 33 (Can.), s. 3.1.
322. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c 1 (5th Supp.) (Can.), § 149.1 (6)(21) (“For greater
certainty, subject to subsections (6.1) and (6.2), a registered charity with stated purposes that
include the advancement of religion shall not have its registration revoked or be subject to any
other penalty under Part V solely because it or any of its members, officials, supporters or
adherents exercises, in relation to marriage between persons of the same sex, the freedom of
conscience and religion guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”).
323. Id.
324. Waldron, supra note 315, at 254.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 255.
328. Id.
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philosophical or religious belief,” 329 and therefore, is not worthy
of protection.
According to Waldron, same-sex marriage, unlike racial
discrimination, does fall under the realm of belief that merits legal
protection. 330 She views the U.S. Supreme Court Obergefell 331 decision
as making it clear that marriage comes down to belief. Those
advocating same-sex marriage, on the one hand, are of the belief that
marriage is “wholly at the service of the state and of individual choice
and autonomy.” 332 Marriage “is what the state says it is and that is the
end of the matter.” 333
On the other hand, marriage as a heterosexual institution is
grounded in a different understanding of human nature based on a
natural law view usually accompanied with a belief in God. Therefore,
it is a belief worthy of protection. 334 Those of this view see men and
women as complementary—men and women are not complete
without the other and form the basic relationship upon which the
community is built and expanded by the children the
relationship produces. 335
Since marriage is a matter of belief, both sides of the marriage
debate are worthy of legal protection. Racial discrimination, debunked
by historical animosity and science, is not worthy. Discrimination is
not all the same. While the majority of society is of the view that samesex marriage is considered a public good, there are those, perhaps of
a minority position, who are of the view that heterosexual marriage is
the public good. Both deserve protection. Room must be had for the
TWU’s in the world to carry on their religious belief and practice of
traditional heterosexual marriage. The justification for such a stand is

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Id.
Id. at 256.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Waldron, supra note 315, at 258.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 259.
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that state must be neutral 336 on competing “unfalsifiable
belief systems.” 337
Finally, the rhetorical purpose of the BJU analogy is curious. It has
the effect of maligning TWU. TWU has never held any such racist
views or had any comparable policies on race. For that matter, there is
no evidence that any Canadian religious university had such a view.
During argument, the NSBS counsel stated, “I guess the most that
can be said is that their [TWU] freedom of religion includes getting a
recognized law degree from a law school where LGB people are not
welcome. I don’t know any other way to articulate it.” 338 Another
argued, “There’s nothing in the statement of faith . . . suggesting it is
a religious requirement not to share the air in the classroom or
elsewhere with persons who are nonbelievers in the dogma of the
Evangelical Free Church.” 339
Further, whatever one’s view about whether sexual orientation is
akin to class or race is beside the point, because to make the analogy
is to suggest that TWU is violating public policy by believing and
practicing traditional marriage on its campus. There is no such public
policy, either in law or social norms that suggests that a religious
university supporting traditional marriage is wrong.
However, to be consistent, the legal revolution would also have to
argue that TWU’s charitable tax status should be removed because
TWU had discriminated against sexual equality by supporting

336. In S.L. v. Comm’n scolaire des Chênes, 2012 SCC 7, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 235, para. 32
(Can.) (“[S]tate neutrality is assured when the state neither favours nor hinders any particular
religious belief, that is, when it shows respect for all postures towards religion, including that of
having no religious beliefs whatsoever, while taking into account the competing constitutional
rights of the individuals affected.”), and in Loyola High Sch. v. Quebec, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 613,
para. 159 (Can.), the SCC rejected the imposition of a neutrality requirement of Quebec’s
religion and ethics curriculum on Loyola, a Catholic high school, that would force Catholic
teachers to choose between expressing a neutral (and therefore insincere) viewpoint on an ethical
question about the Catholic faith or simply remaining silent. Neither was acceptable, said the
SCC. In Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay, 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 132
(Can.), the SCC stated, “true neutrality presupposes that the state abstains from taking a position
on questions of religion.”
337. Waldron, supra note 315, at 262.
338. Transcript of Oral Argument at 176, lines 27–31, Trinity W. Univ. v. N.S. Barristers’
Soc’y, [2015] NSSC 25, para. 230 (Can.) (No. 427,840).
339. Id. at 7 lines 6–14.
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traditional marriage, and such discrimination is contrary to public
policy and not a public benefit. 340
To be successful, therefore, the legal revolution would have to
either persuade Parliament to repeal those applicable sections of the
Civil Marriage Act and the Income Tax Act, or convince the SCC to
rule that those applicable sections are unconstitutional in light of the
new interpretation given to religion’s place in the law. And, if
successful in accomplishing those goals, the legal revolution would, in
all probability, turn toward all religious charities that uphold
traditional marriage in their operations.
(5) The effect on the legal profession. Should TWU law school
not be accredited, then the “damaging message to the public would
be denying minority evangelical Christians the opportunity to earn
their law degree in a private, faith-based setting that meets the
technical requirements to qualify as a law school,” noted Professor
Faisal Bhabha. 341 “This would,” he continues, “be like saying
‘evangelical Christians are not welcome’ in the legal profession.” 342
The negative effect of the TWU Law School debate on Evangelical
Christians in the legal profession ought not to be discounted. The
Supreme Court of Canada in the TWU 2001 case noted “TWU is not
for everybody; it is designed to address the needs of people who share
a number of religious convictions.” 343 Denying accreditation to the
law school would be in effect saying “TWU is not for anyone.” The
2001 case also recognized that the same logic that denied
accreditation of the education degree because of the Community
Standards could be applied to denying teachers who were members of
a particular church. 344 This was problematic to the SCC in light of the
fact that diversity of Canadian society is partly reflected in the multiple
religious organizations. “[T]his diversity of views should be
respected.” 345 If the legal profession has no room for the TWU School

340. See Templeton, supra note 178.
341. Faisal Bhabha, Hanging in the Balance: The Rights of Religious Minorities, in
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND COMMUNITIES, supra note 226, at 265, 282–83.
342. Id. at 283.
343. Trinity W. Univ. v. B.C. Coll. of Teachers, 2001 SCC 31, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, para.
25 (Can.).
344. Id. at para. 33.
345. Id.
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of Law then what is to prevent the profession from turning on those
legal practitioners who hold the same views as TWU?
The lack of trust exhibited by the legal community toward TWU’s
law school proposal has meant the system has become totally
inefficient. Rather than trust the Federation’s exhaustive review and
decision in favor of TWU, the law societies took the task upon
themselves to re-examine the application de novo, that is, from the
beginning. At each turn, TWU has had to incur additional expense,
effort, time, and energy to meet the ancillary requirements of the
examining law society for documentation, face-to-face consultation,
and attendance at yet another public hearing of the benchers to answer
the very same question decided by the Federation. It is redundant,
inefficient, unnecessary and evidence of a lack of trust. In short, it
grounded the national approval mechanism for law schools to a halt.
We have yet to see the long-term effect of this development, but
already there is one result: the promise of mobility of the legal
profession is in serious jeopardy, as there is a patchwork of some law
societies accepting TWU graduates and others not.
IV. THE DELIBERATIVE WAY FORWARD: ACCEPTING DISSONANCE
The ramifications of the emerging legal revolution against the
current legal paradigm regarding religion will bring disruption to law,
society, and the democratic project. This Article argues that the price
to pay will be dire. It will not be an approach that encourages ongoing
dialogue and respect between competing views on the public good.
We need a deliberative approach that accepts dissonance as a strength,
not a failure. The following seven suggestions introduce an attempt to
move forward.
First, religion matters. Justice Ivan Rand’s observation over sixty
years ago is just as pertinent today: “a religious incident reverberates
from one end of this country to the other, and there is nothing to
which the ‘body politic of the Dominion’ is more sensitive.”346
However, there is a terrible lack of understanding about religion.
Throughout the world, the number of conflicts with religious

346. Saumur v. Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 97 (Can.).

1206

2.BUSSEY.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1127

12/14/2016 3:05 PM

The Legal Revolution Against the Place of Religion

overtones are significant347 So much so that John Kerry, the U.S.
Secretary of State, stated, “if I went back to college today, I think I
would probably major in comparative religion because that’s how
integrated [religion] is in everything that we are working on and
deciding and thinking about in life today.” 348
Religion matters because people believe and are willing to pay a
high personal cost to practice their beliefs. In the past, the law made
sense of this reality by seeking accommodation. Today is no different.
There must be a willingness to engage in conversation that does not
simply put religion in a private corner as if it has no bearing on our
mutual well-being. Given the importance of religion to our
increasingly diverse and plural society, the law must yet again turn its
mind to allowing religious individuals and their institutions to
continue to operate without fear of state reprisal.
Second, the legal profession ought to become knowledgeable
about religion and its societal impact. It is not helpful to characterize
religion as equality’s nemesis when even a cursory review of history
and the development of the law and public policy will show a number
of religiously motivated individuals who sought to break down
barriers of inequality. Examples of such religiously motivated people
include Mahatma Ghandi, Martin Luther King Jr., 349 and Nellie
McClung, 350 one of the “Famous Five” who championed women’s
equality in the Persons Case. 351
There needs to be an understanding of the historic and current
place of religion in the law. Religion will not disappear with continued
secular university education, as if education were some kind of cure
for religion. Religion may change over time to some degree, but its
basic principles will remain salient for a significant group in society. By
maintaining religion’s legal status, the state can never be the sole
determiner of the individual conscience. By necessity, our society will
be one where not every person will agree on such intimate issues as
347. Conflicts are by nature multifaceted involving politics, economics, social status and
historical contexts. Religion is part and parcel of the mix. For a list of twenty-five conflicts
involving religion see Religious peace, violence, & genocide: Religiously-based civil unrest and
warfare, RELIGIOUSTOLERANCE.ORG (Jul. 7, 2015), http://www.religioustolerance.org
/curr_war.htm.
348. Faith-Based Community Initiatives, C-SPAN (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.cspan.org/video/?314438-1/sec-state-kerry-launches-faithbased-community-initiative.
349. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE TRUMPET OF CONSCIENCE (1967).
350. NELLIE L. MCCLUNG, CLEARING IN THE WEST: MY OWN STORY (1945).
351. Edwards v. Canada, [1929] UKPC 86, [1930] A.C. 124 (PC) (appeal taken from Can.).
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human sexuality. Those with whom we disagree will continue to live
out their lives as they see fit. Maintaining a living attitude of tolerance
is a practical application of the Golden Rule—do unto others as you
would have them do unto you. All human beings, religious or nonreligious, have the right to be respected and allowed to live as their
consciences dictate. No state actor, such as a law society, has a right to
impose its view on human sexuality on another.
Third, protection of religious freedom does not depend on
whether an individual’s “beliefs are objectively recognized as valid by
other members of the same religion, nor is such an inquiry appropriate
for courts to make.” 352 However, courts, lawyers, and legislators need
to be mindful of the importance to which individuals attach to their
beliefs. In other words, our law must be willing to see through the
eyes of the believer—not to be “the arbiter of religious dogma,” 353 but
to understand the sincerity of belief. Therefore, the law must ask,
given the sincerely held belief of the claimant, what does it mean (in
the case of TWU) that Evangelical Christians have a university that
maintains a synchronicity with their belief of traditional marriage? It is
here that the law must be willing to see as TWU (and all Christians of
like mind who have such institutions) sees. This is exactly what Justice
Campbell of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia did. He clearly
understood that Evangelical Christians have:
[A] religious faith [that] governs every aspect of their lives. When
they study law, whether at a Christian law school or elsewhere, they
are studying law first as Christians. Part of their religious faith
involves being in the company of other Christians, not only for the
purpose of worship. They gain spiritual strength from communing
in that way. They seek out opportunities to do that. Being part of
institutions that are defined as Christian in character is not an
insignificant part of who they are. Being Christian in character does
not mean excluding those of other faiths but does require that
everyone adhere to the code that the religion mandates. Going to
such an institution is an expression of their religious faith. That is a
sincerely held believe [sic] and it is not for the court or for the NSBS
to tell them that it just isn’t that important. 354

352. Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, para. 43 (Can.).
353. Id. at para. 50.
354. Trinity W. Univ. v. N.S. Barristers’ Soc’y, [2015] NSSC 25, para. 230 (Can.).
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Fourth, the Western state should be neutral in matters of religion
while permitting religion a public role. That does not mean the state
does not consider the practical impact of religious practices, but it does
emphasize the state’s reluctance to interfere with religion. Justice
LeBel stated, “[t]he concept of neutrality allows churches and their
members to play an important role in the public space where societal
debates take place, while the state acts as an essentially neutral
intermediary in relations between the various denominations and
between those denominations and civil society.” 355
This Article argues that when religious communities run
enterprises such as universities, the state has a “democratic
imperative,” to use the words of Justice Gascon, 356 to ensure that it
does not favor “certain religious groups and is hostile to others. It
follows that the state may not, by expressing its own religious
preference, promote the participation of believers to the exclusion of
non-believers or vice versa.” 357
Fifth, the Christian community has maintained the teaching and
practice of traditional marriage for over 2,000 years. The length of
time a community carries on a practice cannot, in and of itself, give it
license to continue that practice if it violates basic human decency.
However, the fact that such a community has practiced a religious
belief for such a long time does entitle that community to have, at the
very least, a rebuttable presumption that it should be entitled to
continue that practice. The religious practice of marriage as one man
and one woman has never been held to violate human rights. Even the
UN Declaration of Human Rights in Article 16 recognizes the right
to heterosexual marriage. 358
Sixth, a citizen of a modern Western democracy can expect to have
dissonance between his or her beliefs and practices and those of fellow
355. Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine, [2004]
2 S.C.R. 650, para. 67 (Can.).
356. Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 75 (Can.).
357. Id.
358. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 16 (Dec. 10,
1948), http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (“(1) Men and women of
full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and
to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its
dissolution. (2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending
spouses. (3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to
protection by society and the State.”).
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citizens or the state. The fact that another believes and practices
differently in matters as intimately private as sexuality must not put
that citizen, or the religious institution with which he or she is
affiliated, at a disadvantage. This is similar to the Supreme Court of
Canada’s discussion about a public school student facing cognitive
dissonance between the way she was raised and the way other students
live their lives. Said the Court it “is simply a part of living in a diverse
society. It is also a part of growing up. Through such experiences,
children come to realize that not all of their values are shared by
others.” 359 So too must we all learn to accept that we will not all be
the same. The SCC continued:
[T]he demand for tolerance cannot be interpreted as the demand to
approve of another person’s beliefs or practices. When we ask people
to be tolerant of others, we do not ask them to abandon their
personal convictions. We merely ask them to respect the rights,
values and ways of being of those who may not share those
convictions. The belief that others are entitled to equal respect
depends, not on the belief that their values are right, but on the
belief that they have a claim to equal respect regardless of whether
they are right. Learning about tolerance is therefore learning that
other people’s entitlement to respect from us does not depend on
whether their views accord with our own. 360

Seventh, when an institution such as TWU is private, peaceable,
non-commercial, and presents no “grave and impending public
danger,” 361 and there is no evidence of abuse of private power, 362 then
the law’s indifference toward that institution’s peculiar discrimination
to maintain an ambiance that respects its religious sensibilities ought
to be maintained. The choice comes down to whether we are a free
and democratic society that allows for difference and the expression of
that difference, or whether we will require sameness in all areas.
Entities such as TWU depend upon the ability to discriminate for its
very existence. 363 Destroying the ability to discriminate in favor of
religious identity will destroy the democratic project—it denies
individual freedom and will limit the ability of our society to maintain

359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
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Chamberlain v. Surrey Sch. Dist. No. 36, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710, para. 65 (Can.).
Id. at para. 66.
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945).
INAZU, supra note 1, at 184.
Id.
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civil peace as religious people are denied their inalienable right to
express their faith in the institutions they decide to found.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has explained that a conflict between two
sovereignties has run throughout human history: the sovereignty of
the state and the sovereignty of the individual conscience, or religion.
Western liberal democracies have been widely successful because they
discovered an efficacious solution to the conflict—the recognition that
the state has no jurisdiction to unduly interfere with the conscience.
The state is not divine. On matters of individual conscience, it is
impotent, and must recognize its proper jurisdiction in maintaining
the democratic project. The history of the West, its practical political
experience, and its philosophical understanding support the
rebuttable presumption that religious belief and practice are to be
accommodated except in the rarest of occasions.
That paradigm is now being challenged by legal academics and
social activists, and has taken root in a large segment of the legal
profession. Currently, there is a tension between those who want to
allow religion’s status to remain and those who demand limiting, if
not expunging, religion’s protected status in the law. The TWU Law
School case has become ground zero in the revolutionary demand that
the paradigm of religious protection be reformed to deny a minority
religious group the ability to maintain its community based on its
traditional sexual norms.
The religious freedom paradigm runs deep within Western law.
Many of the social, political, and legal norms that once animated the
West have given way to modern secular norms. In some respects, the
challenge to the paradigm is but an evolution of those changing
norms. However, this Article suggests that the challenge to religion’s
place in law goes much deeper and will have a profound impact on the
law and society. Religion is not like the other social issues currently in
discussion, such as the legalization of prostitution or physician-assisted
suicide. Religion is more expansive—so expansive that it hovers over
the entire body politic in the individual conscience.
Typically, after each revolution there is a new age. What might the
future be without the old paradigm of accommodating religion? The
more likely outcome, with the rising tension between religious
practice and conflicting societal norms, is that state entities will require
an increase of resources to address the non-conformists. For example,
1211
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despite the Alberta government not having to provide a legal
exemption to the photograph requirement for issuing drivers’ licenses
to the Hutterites, 364 the Hutterites have every intention of continuing
to seek that exemption. They continue to maintain “faith that things
would eventually change.” 365 In other words, religious conviction and
practice is not going away simply because the Supreme Court denied
the Hutterites’ exemption. “[L]iving according to God’s commands
was more important to them then [sic] following the rules and
regulations of men.” 366 Trouble of this type is bound to increase. As
this Article has illustrated, religious persecution is the result of state
imposition on the personal space of individual conscience. State
demands for total sovereignty will be met by a recalcitrance of the
religiously committed. Western democracy has worked because the
ruling class accepted religious accommodation in exchange for
civil peace.
It is not difficult to speculate what conflicts might ensue in the
event that religion is no longer accommodated as it once was. The
“easy targets” are tax benefits, including the removal of registered
charitable status and property tax exemption for religious institutions
that refuse to adopt public norms. Ironically, such a development may
allow religious communities, such as churches, to be more vocal on
public issues because they would no longer fear removal of registered
charitable status.
On the other hand, religious institutions that are defined as
“public,” such as schools and universities, might face denial of state
accreditation. This would dampen their viability. Very few parents and
students would be willing to pay for private education without
state recognition.
Beyond the institutional effects is the greater societal impact of
refusing to accommodate religion. Civil society would be considerably
weaker as religious communities withdraw from society at large.
Religious communities such as the Hutterites, the Amish and the Old
Order Mennonite groups are constant reminders that religious
communities are very resourceful in maintaining their religious
364. Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (Can.).
365. Howard Kislowicz, Law, Religion, and Feeling Included/Excluded: Case Studies in
Canadian Religious Freedom Litigation, 30 CANADIAN J. L. & SOC’Y 365, 380 (2015).
366. Bruce Bonta, Alberta Hutterites Solve Photo ID Problem, U. ALA. BIRMINGHAM (Mar.
4, 2010), https://cas.uab.edu/peacefulsocieties/2010/03/04/alberta-hutterites-solve-photoid-problem.
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lifestyle in the midst of opposition. These Anabaptist groups have had
500 years of creating a world within a world. While they do interact
with the secular world, it is primarily limited to commerce. One can
expect other religious communities to follow a similar path to protect
their way of life.
Despite the best wishes of those who desire religion to be at an
end, like Richard Dawkins 367 and Sam Harris, 368 it is inconceivable that
religion will ever cease to be a force to be reckoned with. Religion, in
all its forms, is a constant reality on the planet. Alister McGrath noted
that “[t]here’s something about human nature that makes us want to
reach out beyond rational and empirical limit, questing for meaning
and significance.” 369 As Charles Taylor noted, religion “remains a
strong independent source of motivation in modernity.” 370 Given the
reality that religion shall remain, a legal revolution that eliminates or
severely curbs religious accommodation in the public sphere will place
significant pressure on the democratic project. Religious holy days,
garb, food practices, and sexual ethics will not suddenly disappear
because the law has not provided accommodation. The history of
Western Civilization teaches us that we are best able to maintain civil
peace when religious accommodation is a high priority in public
policy. Losing this tradition, losing this paradigm will cause significant
negative consequences to society’s efficacy. Whether the price of this
revolution is worth it in the end will be determined by
future generations.

367. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION (2006).
368. SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE OF
REASON (2004).
369. ALISTER MCGRATH, WHY GOD WON’T GO AWAY 146 (2010).
370. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 530 (2007).
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